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Sir Mowry Esq
from the Author

REMARKS

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1900.

ON THE

PROPOSALS

MADE TO GREAT BRITAIN,

FOR OPENING

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE,

IN THE YEAR 1807.

By WILLIAM ROSCOE, Esq.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY J. M'CREERY, FLEET-STREET,

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1808.

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PREFACE.

THAT the exercise of private judgment, and the privilege of expressing that judgment on public men and public measures, are inseparable from the nature, and indispensible to the continuance of our free constitution, few persons will be found hardy enough to deny. Without the exercise of this right, we should, as Britons, have nothing to contend for, and might be properly classed with the most oppressed vassals on the continent, under either their former or their present tyrants. If this be the fact, it will follow, as an unavoidable consequence, that the more critical and hazardous the situation of the country is, the more necessary is it that such a right should be freely and fearlessly exercised. To what purpose would it be that the people should enjoy such a privilege, a privilege not granted to them, but retained by them in the

very principle of their political union, and never relinquished even in the worst of times, if, at the very season when the use of it is of the most vital importance, its exercise should be discountenanced, or its existence denied? So far, however, is this from being admissible, that the necessity of the public attention increases with the increase of the public dangers; and that manifestation of opinion which in times of security and repose may be a matter of indifference, becomes, in situations of hazard, a matter of duty.

It ought however to be fully understood, that notwithstanding the people may differ in opinion as to the nature or expediency of a war, yet, in all measures that are calculated for the defence of the country and the effectual carrying on of that war, they must chearfully and unanimously concur. But although this be our first and most indispensible duty, it is not the whole of our duty. To presume it to be so, would be to reduce mankind to the level of brutes, that know no termination of their violence but in their mutual destruction. War, amongst civilized nations, can only be justified when it becomes the sole means of providing for the general safety, and of securing a just and

honourable peace. At what period the opportunity of accomplishing this may occur, is a question on which the sovereign is to decide; but upon which the people, as on all other subjects of government, have a right to express their opinion. On this point considerate persons may differ, not only according to their different talents, temper, and interests, but according to the different degree of information which they may have been able to obtain; and hence it must happen, that discussions on the subject of peace are the continual concomitants of a state of warfare.

Such appear to be the sacred rights to which, as subjects of a free state and a limited monarchy, we are indisputably entitled, and such the precautions and boundaries within which the exercise of that right ought to be confined. This however opens a field sufficiently large for the exercise of the greatest talents. In contemplating the history of past ages, we are attracted by the feelings common to all our kind. Man, in every situation and at every period, is, to man, an interesting object of inquiry. But in the events of the present day, we feel a much

deeper concern. The objects of the past and of the present times are no more to be compared to each other in point of importance, than the exhibitions of the theatre, to the business of real life, or the contemplation of a gallery of portraits, to the intercourse of our family and friends. On the ardour with which the people engage in these subjects, and on the assiduity with which they obtain information and disseminate just ideas respecting them, depend, in an eminent degree, the honour, the credit, and the welfare of the country. It is the great result of this aggregate of sentiment that, in a free state, forms the character of a nation. It is by this that the conduct, not only of subordinate ministers, but of the sovereign himself, must be ultimately decided upon, and it is under this sanction, the most honourable sanction that a nation can give, that the family of Brunswick is now seated upon the British Throne. According as this result is correct and enlightened, or inaccurate and debased, the people may be said to be wise or foolish, virtuous or wicked. This is that conscience of a nation, of which every individual forms a part, but which can only be manifested in its general effects. If, in pri-

vate life, it be the first duty of every person to obtain just and accurate notions with respect to his moral conduct, it is no less the duty of a nation to erect and establish for itself such a standard, as may enable it to conduct its concerns in a manner consistent, at the same time, with its own honour and interests, and the just rights of other independant states. To assert that no such independant rights exist, is not only to abrogate that immense code of positive and written law, which has been universally assented to by civilized states, and is acted upon in all countries, as an important branch of municipal law, but to libel human nature itself. If not a line of that code had ever been committed to writing, these rights would equally have existed. It is upon these principles alone, which have been so accurately investigated and so well understood, that human society can be maintained; and they who labour to overthrow them, would, if they could succeed in their blind and guilty efforts, only reduce the human race to an absolute despotism on the one hand, or to interminable anarchy and war on the other.

The love of our country, and a perfect de-

votion to its interests, are sentiments which every subject ought to feel; but the affections, it is said, are not voluntary, and in order to be loved and esteemed, a country must be virtuous and respectable. There may be hordes of banditti, and combinations of pirates, who may act together from the impulse of a common interest and a common danger; but esteem is a virtuous sentiment, and can only be felt towards that which is itself estimable. Degrade and debase the country, and the very sentiment of patriotism is in danger of being extinguished; not by the fault of the people, but by the misconduct of their rulers.

> " No more thy country; but an impious crew
> " Of men conspiring to uphold their state
> " By worse than hostile deeds; violating the ends
> " For which our country is a name so dear."

Let it however be remembered, that no misconduct in the rulers, or perversity in the people, can release a good subject from the obligations which he owes to the country which has given him birth. Like the attachment of a child to his parents, the bond is indissoluble. But if this be a rule of universal import, with how much greater force

does it apply to this country, where there is more virtue for us to honour, more talent to admire, more freedom to preserve, and more individual happiness to defend, than in any other nation upon earth. In proportion therefore to the dangers with which she is surrounded, and to the errors, or the crimes, in which she is involved, will be the efforts which every real friend to his country ought to make, to relieve her from her state of degradation, and to restore her to rectitude, to honour, and prosperity. In the performance of this severe but indispensible task, he will frequently have to assume a tone of harshness and reproof, and when imminent destruction seems to await her, will warn her even by threats and denunciations from the dangerous precipice. How liable this conduct is to be mistaken, or misrepresented, as the effect of a perverse and unfriendly disposition, it is easy to perceive; nor are the present times without instances of men of the highest endowments, and best intentions, having fallen a sacrifice to such unfounded imputations. To flatter the prejudices, foment the pride, and encourage or excuse the crimes of a people, is the surest way to obtain their favour; but to weigh their

conduct, and estimate their character in an impartial scale, to point out their faults, and banish those delusions in which they delight, is always an invidious, and frequently a dangerous task. In all ages, the rage of popular violence has been principally directed against the best friends and benefactors of mankind. Yet, shall it be said that the awful admonitions with which both sacred and profane history abound, and which were intended to warn a people of the calamities which impended over them, if they persisted in an idolatrous, immoral, or erroneous course of conduct, were the result of animosity, resentment, or ill-will? Is the man who points out the consequences of such an obstinate perseverance, to be considered as an enemy to his countrymen? or is not that character more justly applied to those, who treat as romantic and exploded those maxims of justice and honour, which it has been the boast of England to have so long maintained.

The same considerations which tend to shew the reason why an individual may occasionally address his countrymen in the language of animadversion and reproof, may

serve also to explain another circumstance which frequently subjects him to still greater odium. Can it be allowable, it may be asked, that any person shall point out the errors or the faults of his own country and its rulers, and pass over without still greater reprobation the misconduct of other nations with which she is at enmity; the crimes of whose people and whose governments are of the deepest dye?—The answer is, that it is allowable; and for this very reason; that our country has a claim upon our services which a foreign country has not. The one bears a near resemblance to that self examination, without which the sense of morals in individual character would soon be lost; the other is the admonishing of a stranger, of whose motives we can only imperfectly judge, and for whose conduct we are not accountable. But it may be said that virtue and vice admit of degrees, and that however we may ourselves have erred, it may be proper to shew that the guilt of other nations has far exceeded our own. To what purpose? Will the crimes of others be an apology for ours? and is it desirable that we should diminish the sense of our own misconduct by comparing it with the more enormous offences of others?

This however is the fashion of the present day. If any one should suggest, that some particular measure of our government is of an unjustifiable or a doubtful nature, he is told in reply, to look at the conduct of our enemies. The atrocities that have unhappily been perpetrated in other countries, are continually recalled to sight; and the tyranny and crimes of their present rulers, and the debasement and subjugation of the people, serve at the same time to gratify malignity and to justify abuse. Not content with this, we are daily imposed upon by many of those who have obtained an influence over the public mind, by the grossest falsehoods, and the most absurd exaggerations. And, after all, what is the inference that we are called upon to derive from these representations? Is it that we ought to convert them into lessons of utility? That if such be the dreadful consequences of slavery, we should be doubly watchful in the preservation of our own liberties from the incroachments of arbitrary power? That if the treachery, the cruelty, and the injustice of our enemies, have excited the detestation of mankind, we should set an example of magnanimity, of lenity, of fidelity, in all our transactions, which should place us at the greatest

possible distance from those whose misconduct we so justly reprobate and abhor? Is this, in fact, the use that is attempted to be made of them? or is there not, on the contrary, too much reason to apprehend, that the enormities of others are only dwelt upon as a pattern and a justification of our own? That the commission of certain crimes, on the part of our enemies, may be supposed to render it necessary that similar crimes should be committed by ourselves? And that as long as we have not plunged into those depths of guilt and depravity which we presume our neighbours to have done, we may congratulate ourselves on our superiority, and boldly challenge the favour of heaven?

In arraigning our own misconduct there is but little reason to fear that we shall treat ourselves with too much severity; but in pointing out the errors and the crimes of others, there are some grounds to apprehend that the feelings of hostility may warp our judgments, and disqualify us from forming an impartial decision. In speaking of other governments, our praise or our censure is too often distributed, not according to their positive deserts, but according to the attachment or enmity which they manifest towards

ourselves. It may perhaps be said, that it is necessary to keep up the spirit of our naval and military defenders, by frequent representations of the misconduct and the guilt of our enemies; and that even if these be exaggerated, it is one of those pious frauds which are justified by the circumstances of the times, and the necessity of providing for our own defence. Is it then requisite that in order to excite the courage of our countrymen we must inspire them with the feelings of animosity and revenge? Have they not a sufficient motive to call forth all the powers, both of their mind and body, in the reflection that they are defending their sovereign, their freedom, and their country? The abhorrence of guilt, in itself so laudable, is of all passions the most liable to be carried to excess, and to become the unsuspected pretext of crimes yet more enormous. If, however, it should still be thought necessary to display before the British public the abominations of France, there are those who find it too consistent with the gratification of their passions, and too conducive to their profit, to suffer us to grow languid for want of their exertions. But the more impartial observer, whilst he condemns the excesses of others, will not fail to inquire

into the circumstances that have given rise to them; and the professed advocate for peace will scarcely be expected to counteract his own purpose, by expatiating on the causes of dissension and seeking for new and problematical reasons of alienation and ill-will.

In addition to these observations, it may be further necessary to remark, that although our country has the first claim to our affections and our services, this ought by no means to prevent us from regarding with sentiments of justice and of friendship the rest of mankind. Even the feelings of hostility against our avowed enemies should be only of a temporary nature, to be discarded from our bosoms whenever we may be enabled to induce them to a reconciliation. True patriotism is a wise and enlightened sentiment, which leads us to promote the welfare of our country by just and allowable means; but that factitious feeling which prompts us to obtain advantages by acts of injustice and oppression, is not patriotism, but the worst extreme of selfishness. Can the man who has divested himself, in a great degree, of that selfishness which is almost a part of his nature, be expected to feel for the community that unjust preference

which he has learnt to relinquish for himself? or will not, on the contrary, his feelings and his habits be uniform? and will he not be disposed to weigh with fairness and impartially the different claims of all those who ceme within the sphere of his influence? Whilst he is just to his family and his friends, shall he, for their sakes, be unjust to his country? or whilst he is just to his country, shall he be unjust to the rest of the world? To suppose so, is to suppose that he acts upon two opposite principles, and that when he arrives at a certain point, his virtue recoils upon itself and becomes the very reverse of what it was before.

The truth is, that a patriot must be a virtuous man, and a virtuous man will not commit, or encourage injustice, for the sake either of himself or others. After having participated his affections with those around him, he will be anxious to promote their interests; but he will promote them in the same manner only as he would his own. School'd to the restraint of his own passions, he will not flatter and inflame those of the populace. In acting for his country, he will seek for no advantages, but such as under similar cir-

cumstances he would endeavour to obtain for himself. If, in the one case, he would not way-lay and rob an unsuspecting neighbour, in the other, he would not enrich his country by piracy, violence, and spoil. In this he would do, not only what is abstractedly right, but what is truly and ultimately for the real interest of his country. This globe is a society of states; and nations as well as individuals have each their peculiar character. To grasp at temporary advantages, to oppress a weaker or circumvent an incautious neighbour, may frequently, in private life, be attended with success; and states and nations may, in like manner, seem, for a while, by a similar conduct, to promote their prosperity. But the foundation is unsound, and the edifice of their greatness is built on sand. By the system of Providence, and the constitution of human affairs, a continual barrier is forming against such unjust aggressions; which are counteracted by the influence of public opinion, the distrust and resentment of surrounding states, and a thousand unforeseen circumstances, that either frustrate the expected advantage, or retaliate its injustice; and not

unfrequently subject the aggressor to the very evils intended to be inflicted on others. It is therefore only by strictly conforming to the eternal principles of right and justice, that we can consult either our own honour or our own interest; and to desert these principles when a particular occasion puts them to the test, is to exclude ourselves, by our own act, from the pale of civilized society, and to render ourselves, as it were, outlaws to the rest of the world.

Such appear to be the positive and relative duties of the subjects of a free state; but if they who obey be accountable, both to themselves and the public, for the propriety of their conduct, they who are entrusted with the executive power of a state have a still more weighty task imposed upon them. In claiming from the people a general assent to their measures, and a perfect unanimity of support, they must take care that such measures are consistent with the acknowledged laws of universal justice, and are not subversive of those first principles of morals which are antecedent to every other law of society. As man to man, there are certain duties incumbent on us, the violation of

which no pretext of political necessity, or national hostility, can justify. To inculcate upon the people ideas of a contrary tendency, and to weaken their faith in the existence of political virtue, is not less impolitic than it is erroneous. That governments, as well as individuals, are actuated only by selfish motives, and that the professions which they are continually making of veracity, fidelity, honour, and frankness, are merely a cloak for their criminal views, are sentiments which it is thought a mark of penetration to have discovered, and a proof of sincerity to avow. But whatever may be thought of the sagacity of such politicians, to act upon the conviction of such sentiments is dangerous. God has not abandoned his creation; nor are the common feelings of human nature wholly extinguished amongst mankind. If there be depravity, there is yet integrity: If there be oppression, there is yet sympathy: If there be baseness, there is yet honour: If there be treachery, violence and rapine, there are still the inextinguishable feelings of virtuous indignation and generous contempt; and they who direct their conduct either in public or private life with a total disregard to these truths,

will, whatever may be their temporary success, incur upon the whole, not only disappointment, but disgrace.

That the sentiments here attempted to be enforced, will not be likely to meet with general assent, I can readily conceive. There are some at present, who boldly deny the existence of any duties or rights between independant states. There are others, who whilst they admit that such relations subsist and have been acted upon, conceive that they are not of indispensible obligation; but that it is allowable to deviate from them in cases in which our safety or our interest is involved; and that as these cases are subject to no positive rule, they must be decided and acted upon according to circumstances; or in other words, at the absolute will of the party concerned. To the former of these, I have nothing to say. Their error, I fear, is not in their judgment only. But to the latter I would beg leave to observe, that I am perfectly well aware that the duties of human beings, both in their collective and individual capacities, are of a relative kind; and that precepts of absolute import must frequently be modified by various circumstances,

which either render their application wholly impracticable, or, if practicable, defeat their proper result. The general rule is, *Thou shalt do no murder*, but this is not to prevent me from defending myself to extremities against any one by whom I may be unjustly attacked. The breach of moral obligation is by my enemy, and not by me. But although the right of self defence must be fully admitted, yet it is not a right of an undefined or uncertain nature, as is too often erroneously supposed, but is confined to situations of immediate danger, when defence and attack become convertible terms; and cannot, without a total breach of moral obligation, be extended to remote probabilities, which are to be guarded against or counteracted by wise and prudent precautions, and not by becoming ourselves the offenders, and perpetrating the very crime, the intention of which we impute to others. If this were not the case, the greatest cruelties and enormities that ever were committed by tyrants and oppressors against either states or individuals, might be perfectly justified; for what danger is so remote, what circumstance so trivial, as not to be a cause of alarm to a tyrannical, a suspicious, or a cowardly mind? But the right of self de-

fence is a right of strict construction, and as such it is considered by the good sense of our English law; which admits of no palliatives of a crime from remote and contingent apprehensions, but requires that the peril should be imminent, and even unavoidable by any other means of defence; and if this were not the case, the law would be of no more use in the one instance, than the rule of moral conduct would be in the other. It must also be observed, that even these considerations, instead of invalidating the general rule that unconditionally prohibits injustice and oppression, prove only the greater necessity of its further application. Those circumstances by which we are compelled to resort to measures, which, although not abstractedly justifiable, are perfectly so in the situation in which we are involuntarily placed, can only, for the most part, arise from the errors, the injustice, or the crimes of others. But the rule is of general application. It is as imperative upon my enemy as upon myself; and if he had not violated it, I should not have been compelled to do so. Thus the perpetration of one criminal act frequently gives rise to a long train of unhappy circumstances, which, if not always criminal in themselves (as, from the violent

feelings and passions of mankind they generally are) serve to enhance the guilt of the original deviation, and at the same time to demonstrate in the strongest light the universal necessity of a strict and inviolable adherence to the general rule. It may however perhaps, be said, that human nature is, at the best, imperfect, and that notwithstanding all our efforts, vice and misconduct will frequently and indeed inevitably occur; but this, it is to be observed, is to be lamented, and not to be vindicated; to be branded, and not excused. Would these evils be likely to be diminished by reducing our standard of moral rectitude to a lower level? or is it not, on the contrary, only by preserving the moral principle pure and unsullied, that we can hope to prevent the total degradation and ruin of the human race? To deviate in practice from these dictates of eternal obligation is highly culpable: but to admit of, and sanction such deviation in theory, is infinitely more so. The one is a guilty action; the other establishes a rule of guilt, and recommends it to practice in all future times. Whatever enormities may have been committed by the leaders of armies and the conquerors of mankind, they are often less culpable than

those who have recorded their exploits. In the agitation of all the most violent passions of our nature, in the conflict of hope and of fear, of glory and of shame, of self-preservation, of animosity and of revenge, atrocities have been transacted over which our humiliated sense of human imperfection would gladly throw a veil. But when the narrator of these transactions, instead of marking them with his indignation, recommends them to our notice and our imitation, as the usual and allowable course of conduct on similar occasions; when the statesman founds his measures, not upon the primitive maxims of justice and rectitude, but on the imitation of other states, whose enormities and whose guilt are universally acknowledged; when the moralist descends from his dignified eminence into the vulgar crowd, and lowers his standard to accommodate it with more accuracy to the level of the present day, an inroad is then prepared for every species of depravity and every kind of abuse. That guilt which was before incidental only, is then reduced to a system, and mankind become unjust upon principle, cruel and revengeful by common assent, and wicked by rule. In this situation the diffusion of the public sentiment is like the spread-

ing of a pestilence; the freedom of the press, instead of being an advantage, becomes a curse to a country; and they who pretend to be the instructors become the corruptors of mankind. That the united efforts of all the friends of virtue can ever succeed in banishing vice and error from the face of the earth, it would be preposterous to suppose; but the operation of moral causes on the character and situation of mankind, is, even yet, but imperfectly known. To what a degree of depravity nations may fall, we have had but too many instances. To what heights of moral and intellectual excellence they may rise, we have had fewer examples; but neither the one nor the other is to be considered as the utmost extreme of which our nature is capable. We know however enough to enable us to distinguish light from darkness; and if, by the constant assertion and defence of the eternal rules of justice and morality, we cannot establish *a Heaven upon earth*, we may, at least, prevent that earth from becoming a *Pandemonium*.

I have been principally led to these remarks in consequence of the various animadversions and misrepresentations to which

my late publication, *On the Causes, Objects, and Consequences of the present War*, has given rise. To many of these I should think it a disgrace more particularly to reply.* If the immoral principles and dangerous doctrines that have been asserted by some of my opponents be

* I shall, however, avail myself of this opportunity to notice an error in page 91, of that publication, where in pointing out the inconsistency of the assertion in the British declaration in answer to that of Russia, that France is *essentially* hostile both to Russia and this country, I have quoted a passage which the reader will immediately perceive relates, not to the war with France, but to the war between Great Britain and the *Porte*, which in the same declaration is stated to have been undertaken by Great Britain *at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining Russian interests against the influence of France;* whereas the passage intended to have been cited, is that in which it is said, that the last negotiation between *Great Britain* and *France was broken off upon points not immediately affecting his Majesty's own interests, but those of his imperial ally.*—On being apprized of this error I lost no time in correcting it in the copies remaining unsold; and it will, I trust, appear, that the remark is at least equally supported by the passage which in fact suggested it, and which is now given, as by that to which I had erroneously referred.

allowed to prevail, violence and war will be legitimated, and it will be the least important consequence of such a result, that I have mistaken my object, and misemployed my time. But from the efforts of such adversaries, there can be nothing to fear; and indeed their pernicious maxims have already been pointed out to public notice, and consequently to public reprobation, by many of the friends of freedom, moderation, and peace. With respect to my own personal feelings, I am well aware that it would have been highly inconsiderate in me, at a season like the present, to have entered on the turbulent stage of political controversy, if I had not been prepared for every consequence to which such a measure might give rise.

"Omnia percepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi."

In concluding these prefatory remarks—I am happy to have an opportunity of sanctioning the opinions I have ventured to maintain, both in this and my former publication, as to the inexpediency of war in general, and its injurious tendency towards this country in particular, by an authority which none of my readers will dispute. This autho-

rity is that of Sir William Young, Bart. long an assiduous and distinguished member of the British Parliament, whose general knowledge of those subjects which enable him to form a proper judgment on the vicissitudes and fate of nations, as well as his intimate acquaintance with economical and commercial affairs, are evinced by his valuable publications, and are indeed universally acknowledged. This gentleman, at the conclusion of his WEST INDIA COMMON-PLACE BOOK, published in 1806, after inquiring by what means relief is likely to be obtained to the maritime interests of the country, and declaring it to be his decided opinion that "*peace* can only have "that effect, and that even peace cannot "have a certain and full effect, if too long "delayed,"—thus proceeds,—

"The evil is the result of long protracted "war, and with such war, must continue, "increase, and gain head and strength, and "from year to year become less remedi-"able."

"Long protracted wars ever have been, "and ever must be, pregnant with mis-"chief and disorders to every condition of

" people and government so unhappily en-
" gaged; but most of all, will they fatally
" affect a commercial people, and a free go-
" vernment, such as ours."

" Long duration of war must, in its na-
" ture and course, divert from social duties
" and occupations; must depress industry
" and obstruct commercial intercourse; must
" corrupt manners and morals; and, finally,
" must effect a change, not only in the cha-
" racters and conduct of men, but in the
" character and the constitution of the state
" itself; for at the same time that long habits
" of military dissipation and distinctions must
" cast in oblivion, or impair the domestic
" virtues and gradations of society, the mi-
" litary principles of despotism and subjec-
" tion will creep in, to vitiate, and ultimately
" to supersede those of regulated govern-
" ment and liberty."

" Commerce, and a carrying trade, is but
" one of the losses, and not the most impor-
" tant loss, to be apprehended, from an
" over protracted state of war."

" Justin, speaking of the continued war

" with the Peloponnese, says, *Non erunt Athe-*
" *nienses vi victi, sed fortunæ varietate* DE-
" BELLATI. Industry was warred down;
" commerce was warred down; the sense
" of virtue and freedom was warred down;
" and all finally was lost."

" I have heard language, and in societies
" where I should have expected better and
" wiser consideration, that *war is to be pre-*
" *ferred to any peace with the present enemy of*
" *Great Britain.* Vain, light, and impro-
" vident indeed is the language, which ob-
" jects, not to terms of peace, but to peace
" itself; as if *a state of perpetual war* was a
" fitting condition of civilized society, and
" so to be preferred, and by a people and go-
" vernment such as ours. The intimations
" with which I have introduced this im-
" portant subject, lead to far other in-
" ference."

" In any negotiation for peace, may our
" ministers peremptorily require conditions
" of honour, justice, and security; as I
" trust my country hath yet the further
" means to contend for these her rightful pre-
" tensions by force of arms; but let us re-

" member that NO WAR IS, OR CAN BE JUST
" AND WISE, WHICH IS NOT WAGED WITH
" VIEWS TO PEACE."

" On good and fair conditions, I pray
" to God that peace may speedily be restored
" to my country!"

And in this patriotic aspiration I most truly and ardently join.

W. B.

Allerton, April 20th, 1808.

REMARKS, &c.

AT the time when I lately ventured to lay my sentiments before the public, in a Pamphlet, entitled, *Considerations on the Causes, Objects, and Consequences of the present War, and on the Expediency or the Danger of Peace with France,* it was generally supposed, that since the unsuccessful result of the negotiations in 1806, some propositions had been made to Great Britain, through the medium of neutral powers, for entering upon such discussions as might be likely to tend to the restoration of peace; but the particulars of such negotiations had not then been laid before Parliament.

In that publication it was my object, not only to demonstrate the expediency

of peace to this country, but also to shew that no circumstances had then occurred, which could be taken as a decisive proof that our enemies were not disposed towards it; and thereby to remove, as far as admitted facts would allow, those jealousies and suspicions which seemed to oppose themselves to every idea of future pacification. But although it may perhaps sufficiently appear, that we might, by a more conciliatory temper and conduct, have avoided the renewal of the war in 1803, and might also, in all probability, but for our alliance with Russia, have concluded an advantageous peace in 1806, yet it may not follow, that in 1807, when the circumstances of Europe were so materially changed, the same pacific sentiments were entertained by the French Ruler. Posterity will not fail to remark, that during the administration of Mr. Pitt, the continuance of the war was justified by him upon two distinct grounds, which admirably suited every possible occasion. One of these was, that it was not advisable to

make peace with France whilst the British arms were successful;* the other, that it was not expedient, as long as France retained her power and influence.† It might therefore have happened, that a sentiment similar to the former of these might have actuated the ambitious breast of Bonaparte, and that after his new successes on the Continent, he might have been less inclined to a

* "Are we, I would ask, *to be content with the* "*French relinquishing the conquests* which they have "unjustly made; without either *obtaining reparation* "for the injuries they have done, or *security* against "their future repetition?

"With a prospect of success, so great as we have at "the present moment, *are we to grant them an im-* "*punity?*

"I, for my part, *have given no pledge that I will* "*not interfere in the internal concerns of France.*"— Mr. Pitt's speech on Mr. Fox's motion, June 17, 1793.

† On Mr. Wilberforce's motion for peace, 27th May, 1795, Mr. Pitt acknowledged, "the loss of Holland, "and the diminution of the confederacy; but, *at the* "*present moment*, he contended, perseverance in the "contest was *still more wise* and prudent, and more "likely to effect a lasting, safe, and honourable peace, "than any attempt at negotiation."

reconciliation than he had been in the preceding year. The correspondence on this subject, now laid before Parliament, is doubtless expected by Ministers to demonstrate that this is the fact; or at least, to vindicate themselves from all imputation of being in any degree chargeable as the cause of the present continuance of the war; and to prove that on the contrary they have shewn every disposition, consistent with the honour and interests of the country, for effecting a peace.

That the establishment of peace is the only just and legitimate reason for the continuance of war, is a truth which needs only to be stated, to demand an implicit assent. To this truth, the whole of the correspondence to which I have referred, bears constant homage. Whatever may be the views of the belligerent powers, they are all anxious to persuade the rest of the world, that they only carry on the war by compulsion, and that they are at all times ready to

enter upon any discussion which may be likely to terminate in a just and equitable pacification. In this respect, the professions and assurances of the British Ministry are at least equal to those of any other power. Nothing can be more explicit than the declarations to this effect, as well in the speech of his Majesty's Commissioners, on the opening of the present session of Parliament, as in the various communications of the British Ministers with foreign states. In the former we are assured, "that if "ever there was *a just and national* "*war*, it is that which his Majesty is "now *compelled* to prosecute; that the "war is in its principle *purely defensive*; "and that his Majesty *looks but* to the "attainment of *a secure and honourable* "*peace*." In a communication from Mr. Canning to Count Starhemberg, the Austrian Ambassador to the Court of London, he is informed, "that the King "has never ceased to consider a secure "and durable peace as *the only object of* "*the war* in which his Majesty is en-

" gaged; and that he has never refused " to listen to any suggestions which ap- " peared likely to conduce to the attain- " ment of that object."* That these assurances, so frequently repeated and so solemnly made, should have a powerful effect in convincing the world at large, and the subjects of these realms in particular, that Ministers are sincere in their endeavours to obtain the great object which they profess to have in view, is not surprising. Accordingly, the papers laid before Parliament are referred to, by themselves and their friends, not only with complacency, but with triumph, as decisive evidence of their pacific intentions; and we are confidently told, that his Majesty's Ministers have demonstrated, that *the negotiations have not failed through any indisposition on their part to a just and honourable pacification.*†

* *Correspondence with the Austrian Ambassador, 25th April,* 1807.

† " Neither the *duration* nor the *mode* of the con- " test can fairly be attributed to his Majesty's Govern-

Under these circumstances, I feel myself impelled to enter upon a brief inquiry, how far this opinion of the pacific views of the British Cabinet appears, from the Documents laid before Parliament, to be well founded; and for this purpose it will be necessary to state the proposals which have successively been made to the British Ministry in the course of the last year, and to consider in what manner the discussions to which they gave rise have been conducted, and to what circumstances the

" ment. His Majesty's Ministers have *explicitly* and " *repeatedly* avowed their readiness to open a negotia- " tion for peace, and to put a period to the war, WHEN- " EVER THERE SHALL APPEAR A FAIR PROS- " PECT OF OBTAINING SAFE AND HONOURABLE " TERMS."

From an address of some of the inhabitants of Manchester to their fellow townsmen, on the impropriety of petitioning for peace; and proposing an address to the Sovereign.

total inefficacy of those discussions, in producing the desired result, is justly to be attributed.

From these papers it appears, that in the course of the year 1807, three several propositions were made, under different aspects of the affairs of Europe, for opening negotiations with Great Britain; two of these were made by Austria, and one through the medium of Russia. It might, perhaps, be presumed, that the very making a proposal to negotiate, is, in itself, a sufficient proof of the desire, at least, of a pacification; but on this I shall lay no stress; whether it was advisable to listen to such propositions, or not, must depend on the circumstances under which they were made, and the terms and conditions by which they were accompanied.

On the 18th April, 1807, whilst the contest between Russia and France was

yet undecided, the Austrian Ambassador in London transmitted to his Majesty's Ministers a proposition from the Emperor, offering "his amicable mediation" for effecting a peace between the belligerent powers; promising at the same time "his interposition and good "offices," and "inviting the Cabinets of "Petersburgh, of Berlin, and of the Thuil-"leries, to adopt the same conciliatory "views, and to enter into negotiations "for a peace; in which the essential re-"lations of all the parties interested, "should, as far as it is practicable, be "combined."*

The answer of Mr. Canning "accepts, "so far as his Majesty is concerned, the "offer of his Imperial Majesty's media-"tion, subject only to the condition "of a like acceptance on the part of all

* *Note of Count de Starhemberg, 18th April,* 1807.

" the other powers who are engaged in " the present war."*

Such is the answer in Mr. Canning's Letter; but in the official note of the same date, by which it is accompanied, it is said, that " to such negotiations, " whenever the consent of the other " *parties interested in them shall be* " *obtained*, the King will willingly ac- " cede; and his Majesty *will lose no* " *time* in communicating with such of " those powers as are connected with " him by the bonds of amity and con- " fidential intercourse, for the purpose " of ascertaining their views; *and if* " *those views shall be favourable to his* " *Imperial Majesty's proposal,* of concert- " ing with them the mode in which such " negotiations should be opened, and " of agreeing upon the principles which " (according to the suggestion of his

* *Note of Mr. Canning to the Count de Starhemberg, 25th April,* 1807.

" Imperial Majesty) it might be expe-
" dient previously to establish, as the
" basis and foundation of a general dis-
" cussion and arrangement."*

From this answer, it is reasonable to suppose that the Austrian Ambassador would expect that some steps should immediately have been taken by the British Ministry to consult the allies of this country, and to obtain their determination on the propositions which he had made. The adoption of further measures rested entirely on the result of this previous inquiry, *whether the views of the allies of Great Britain were favourable to his Imperial Majesty's proposal;* and if so, *but not otherwise,* the proposed discussions might proceed. The ministry had thus taken the further prosecution of this business wholly out of the hands of Austria, and had informed the

* *Official Note of Mr. Canning to the Count de Starhemberg, 25th April,* 1807.

Ambassador that *they* would *lose no time* in consulting with their allies. He must therefore naturally have expected to learn the result of these consultations. Did they ever actually take place? If so, was the determination of Great Britain and her allies ever communicated to Austria?—No evidence of any such circumstances appears to have been laid before the public.—In justification of this apparent neglect, it has indeed been asserted, that the important changes which soon afterwards took place in the affairs of Europe prevented any progress being made towards the proposed negotiation. But it must be recollected, that these changes did not occur till the battle of Friedland on the 14th of June, nearly two months after the propositions made by Austria. The intermediate period, a period of no inconsiderable extent, when the object in view is no less than the pacification of Europe, was therefore open for the purpose of consulting our allies, and availing ourselves of the friendly interposi-

tion of Austria; but not a single line has been produced by Ministers to shew that this interval was improved by them to any such pacific purpose.—It appears indeed that copies of the correspondence between Mr. Canning and Count Starhemberg were transmitted to Mr. Adair, the British resident at Vienna, and that Mr. Canning afterwards informed the Earl of Pembroke, then on a mission to that Court, that "his Majesty had accepted of the mediation of Austria, subject only to the "condition of its being equally accepted "by all the other powers principally engaged in the war;" but in what manner that nobleman was to act in consequence of such information, we are at a loss to discover. Certainly, there could be no occasion to dispatch a special envoy to Vienna to inquire into the pacific dispositions of Austria, who had herself made the proposal for a negotiation; and it is therefore probable that his Lordship's mission was rather of a

hostile than a pacific nature; but whatever his object might be, he did not arrive at Vienna till the 3d of July, when a new situation of affairs had taken place on the continent of Europe.* Some correspondence has also been laid before the public between Lord G. L. Gower and General Budberg, in which the British envoy declares, that "whatever "doubts he might have entertained on "the subject of negotiating for a general "peace, they had been completely done "away by a letter from General Bud-"berg to General Buxhovden;" but these discussions, it must be observed, were also subsequent to the battle of Friedland, and seem to have had no relation whatever to the proposals of Austria, but to have had a reference to the treaty of Tilsit. In fact no further commu-

* See the Earl of Pembroke's dispatch of July 8, 1807, in which he says that "he arrived at Vienna on "the 3d of that month, but was *prevented making any* "*progress in the object of his mission*, owing to the ac-"counts received of an armistice, &c."

nication appears to have taken place between Great Britain and Austria until the 20th of November, *upwards of seven months after the proposal was made*, when the attention of the British Cabinet was recalled to the same subject by a new proposition on the part of Austria, to which I shall in due course refer. In the mean time, the impartial public will judge, how far the assurances of the British Ministry, of their *earnest and constant desire for the attainment of peace*, are consistent with their apparent neglect of the most direct and palpable means of carrying that desire into effect.

These communications took place whilst the result of the continental war was yet uncertain, and before the event of the fatal battle of Friedland had decidedly prescribed or influenced the conduct of Russia. To consider what might have been effected *even then*, by a cessation of hostilities, which would probably have been the consequence of the opening of a negotiation, is only to add to

those fruitless regrets, which the events of the present times have so frequently occasioned.* The consequence of this battle, was the treaty of Tilsit, which was signed on the 7th July, 1807. Humiliating as that treaty was for the allies of Great Britain, it afforded a new opportunity of deliberating on the means of terminating the war. By one of the articles, the Emperor of Russia offered himself as a mediator of peace between Great Britain and France, provided his mediation was accepted within the space of one month; but although this stipulation was soon afterwards generally known, it was not officially brought under the cognizance of the British Cabinet until the 1st August, when Mr.

* Lord Hutchinson, in his speech in the House of Peers, on the 9th February, 1808, stated, that during the campaign which terminated in the decisive conflict of the 14th June, 1807, and which lasted only eleven days, there were 1848 Officers killed and wounded, and 27 Generals; and that in the final engagement only, the Russians lost 14,000 men.

Alopeus, the Russian Ambassador at London, notified it to Mr. Canning; at the same time offering the interposition of his Imperial Majesty for the establishment of a general peace, and requesting the determination of the British Ministry on the subject.* The answer of Mr. Canning, after stating at large the pacific dispositions of his Majesty, requires, as a preliminary, the *communication of the treaty of Tilsit*, and "*the statement of* "*those equitable and honourable princi-*" *ples*, upon which his Imperial Majesty "expresses his belief, *that France is de-*" *sirous of concluding a peace with Great* "*Britain.*†" As this reply rendered it necessary for the Russian Ambassador to have recourse to his Court, the correspondence between him and Mr. Canning appears here to have ceased; and the discussion is afterwards continued be-

* *Note of M. Alopeus to Mr. Canning, 1st August,* 1807.

† *Note of Mr. Canning to M. Alopeus, 5th August,* 1807.

tween Lord Granville Leveson Gower, and the Russian Ministers at Petersburgh.

The objects again particularly insisted on by the British Ambassador in these negotiations, were, the communication of the secret articles of Tilsit, and a frank disclosure of the general views and intentions of the Court of St. Petersburgh. In addition to which, it was also desired, that some ostensible proof should be given of the good disposition of his Imperial Majesty towards Great Britain. The specific purport of this last requisition was, that the Emperor should engage with Great Britain in a treaty of commerce, which had previously been a subject of deliberation between the two countries, and the *projét* of which had been recently transmitted by the Russian Ambassador at London to Petersburgh. In answer to these demands, General Budberg, the Russian Minister, "acknowledged the

" existence of secret articles in the treaty " of Tilsit. *There were some*," he said, " *which in no way concerned the interests* " *of England.** That he could assure " him, and, as an honest man, he would " not say it if it were not truth, there ex- " isted no secret article whatever, which " stipulated the shutting the Russian " ports against the British commerce. " That the proposed *project* of a com- " mercial treaty must be considered by " the Minister of Commerce, before he " could confer with the British Envoy " upon it. That it by no means followed, " because Bonaparte had communicated " to the Emperor of Russia the basis " upon which he was ready to conclude " peace with England, that his Imperial

* This expression it will be perceived is equivocal, and may mean, either that there were secret articles, some of which in no way concerned the interests of England; or, that there were some secret articles, none of which in any way concerned the interests of England. As Lord G. L. Gower did not require an explanation, it is probable that he took them in the latter sense.

" Majesty had made any communications
" at Tilsit, of the future views and sys-
" tem of the Court of Petersburgh."*

From this interview it appears, that Bonaparte had not only requested or assented to the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, for effecting a peace with Great Britain, but had actually communicated to him the basis upon which he was ready to conclude it. The British Ambassador did not, however, press for the communication of this basis; conceiving perhaps that such a request would be premature, till he was acquainted with the secret articles; but only required again, to be informed of those articles, and expressed his hopes that the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty of commerce between the two countries might still be continued.

It appears however, that at this criti-

* *Dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower to Mr. Canning, 2d Sep.* 1807.

cal juncture, "a considerable change took "place in the tone and temper of Gene- "ral Budberg's conversation. Instead of "that coldness and reserve which cha- "racterized the replies of the Russian "Minister to the questions which the "British Ambassador had thought it his "duty to put to him in previous con- "ferences, he found a very mild and con- "ciliating manner, and an apparent anx- "iety to remove every difficulty in the "way of a perfectly good understanding "between the two countries." To what circumstance this extraordinary change in the sentiments of the Russian Government is to be attributed, we are not informed. If, however, the British Ambassador had been disposed to forward the negotiation for peace, this appears to have been the proper time for it. He might now, with every prospect of success, have pressed again for the communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; and if those had appeared to be as irrelevant to the interests of Great Britain, as had been represented by the Russian Minis-

ter, he might then have proceeded to require to be informed of the basis on which the French Ruler had proposed to treat. Such, and such alone, was the plain simple path that must have presented itself to any person who had a direct object in view. But with this apparent change of disposition in the Russian Ministry, other prospects opened to the enlarged vision of the British Ambassador, who appears at this important moment to have been actuated by an almost prophetic knowledge of the sentiments of his own cabinet. The *secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit*, *the basis of the proposed negotiation*, and even *the commercial treaty*, were forgotten. He instantly recurred in imagination to those happier days, full of hope and confidence, when upon the very spot where he then stood, he was combining with Russia and Austria, for a secret attack upon France. The lessons of experience were for a moment disregarded. The *deception*, though once defeated, might now be more deeply concealed. From

his silent chamber the shade of Pitt arose, and hovered over his friend. His spirit alone could have dictated the answer of the British Ambassador, when he replied, " That they could not better serve the " cause of Bonaparte than by indulging " in mutual recrimination on the past " conduct of each government. That he " wished *their whole attention should be* " *turned to the future;* and that he was " persuaded, *if the Emperor of Russia* " *still entertained his former opinions of* " *the danger to be apprehended from the* " *preponderance of France,* the cause of " the independance of Europe was by " no means desperate."*

Sentiments so enlightened, and which evidently pointed to the renewal of the war on the continent of Europe, seem to have been too much in unison with those of the British Cabinet not to have met with their most unqualified approbation.

* *2d Dispatch of Lord G. L. Gower, dated 2d Sep.* 1807.

In his reply, Mr. Canning, with an elevation of style, seldom introduced into the diplomatic proceedings of Europe, informs the British Ambassador, that "whatever may have been the motives "or the causes of the change represented "to have taken place in the tone of the "Russian councils, or whatever may be "the probability of the continuance of "the system now apparently adopted, "his Majesty *hails with the most sincere* "*satisfaction* the return of those senti-"ments of friendship and confidence on "the part of his august ally, from which "his Majesty, on his part, has never "deviated, and the cultivation of which "is *more than ever necessary for their* "*common interests.*" The British Envoy is afterwards told, "that he *cannot too* "*constantly impress* upon the Russian "Minister, the topick which he had *so* "*judiciously* employed in the late confer-"ences; that in the present state of the "world, retrospect and recrimination "were worse than useless; and that *the* "*establishment of future good understand-*

"*ing*, and the *concert of measures* to be "taken with a view *to future exertion*, "*were* ALONE *the proper subjects of dis-* "*cussion between the two governments.*".

So much for the *pacific dispositions* of the British Government, and the *sincerity* with which they engaged in discussions for peace. After having thus directed the attention of the British Envoy to that which *alone* was the proper subject of discussion between the two governments, Mr. Canning proceeds, in the same dispatch, to furnish the Ambassador with additional instructions for his future conduct, as to the negotiations for peace. If it should at first sight appear somewhat extraordinary, that after directions so positively given, as to the only object of continuing the intercourse between the two Courts, the British Ministry should still attend to the detail of pacific negotiations: this inconsistency will vanish when the nature of these new instructions is examined. Besides the objects before insisted on by the British Am-

bassador, other demands, of a more general and extensive nature, were now to be made; "*before his Majesty committed himself to the* "*guidance of Russia;*" and in particular, the Ambassador was to require "a disclo- "sure of the general views of policy of "the Emperor of Russia, and of any en- "gagements into which he might have "entered, with respect to the different "powers in whose fate his Majesty takes "an interest." These inquiries are afterwards more particularly explained to relate to the nature of the recognition of the French King of Naples, the movements in the Mediterranean, the surrender of Corfu, and the intentions of Russia with respect to Turkey; a power with whom, it is said, "*his Majesty* "*finds himself at war, and left alone in* "*the war,* FOR NO OTHER THAN RUS- "SIAN INTERESTS, *and from a quarrel* "*espoused by his Majesty for the sake of* "*his ally.*" That these various and important inquiries would, without touching on the negotiation, open many subjects in which the views and temper of

the Russian government might be discovered and influenced, is sufficiently apparent. The Ambassador is then directed " to urge these topics in his con-
" ferences *with all the earnestness which*
" *their importance requires*, but at the
" same time carefully avoiding a strain
" of reproach, and even when he is
" obliged to confess the suspicion of en-
" gagements having been entered into,
" such as his Majesty cannot but dis-
" approve, conducting the inquiry in
" such a manner as should lead M. Bud-
" berg to believe that his Majesty is
" anxious rather to find the means of
" preventing, or remedying the evil,
" than to discover grounds of complaint
" against Russia." The great object, however, to which the Ambassador is, in fact, to attend, is again enforced at the close of the dispatches, in these words:—

" Upon the whole, your Excellency
" will collect from these instructions,
" that his Majesty *is as much desirous as*

" *ever*, to cultivate the friendship and " alliance of the Emperor of Russia; " that he conceives *the only chance of* " *safety for what remains of Europe*, to " depend upon the renewal of a good " understanding between them; that " his Majesty has never, even under " appearances the most unfavourable, " altogether despaired of such a recur- " rence on the part of the Emperor, to " the councils which are best calculated " for his own glory, and for the secu- " rity of his dominions, *as it is now* " *hoped has taken place;* and that his " Majesty, upon such a change, is eager " to forget all that has passed of a na- " ture contradictory to those councils, " or inconsistent with them."*

It was however peculiarly unfortunate for these splendid designs, that the British Ministry had, at this time, too many projects on hand, and that they had not accurately calculated how far

*Dispatch from Mr. Canning to Lord G. L. Gower, 27th September, 1807.

one of them might happen to interfere with the others. At the very moment when the returning favour and attachment of Russia flattered them with the prospect of a new continental war, by another combination against France, the intelligence of the arrival of a British fleet in the Baltic was announced at Petersburgh. This naturally induced the Russian Ministry to make inquiries from the British Ambassador as to its destination, and his answer by no means tended to remove the sensation which so unexpected an occurrence had occasioned. In a few days the apprehensions which Russia professed to entertain for the fate of her ally, were realized, by the information of the bombardment and capitulation of Copenhagen, and the seizure of the Danish fleet. With the information of this outrage, all hopes of prevailing upon Russia to detach herself from the alliance with France, and co-operate with Great Britain in a new continental warfare, instantly vanished. The discussions for a general peace, already disregarded by

the British Ministry, except so far as they might afford an opportunity of prosecuting other objects, were suddenly terminated. The changes that at this time took place in the Russian Cabinet, by which General Budberg was succeeded, as Minister for foreign affairs, by Count Soltykoff, who was soon afterwards removed to make way for Count Romanzow, produced no consequences favourable to the hopes of the British Ministry. Some attempts were indeed made by the British Ambassador, to allay the indignation of the Emperor; but the horrid detail of the transactions at Copenhagen closed up every avenue to reconciliation. "How can Russia re-" commend to Denmark to submit to " the affront she has received, and to " endure with patience all her losses?"* was the emphatic question of the Russian Minister. It was to no purpose that the British Ministry humiliated themselves

* *Dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower to Mr. Canning, October* 29, 1807.

so far, as to declare that his Majesty was perfectly willing, "that the paci-" fication with the Court of Den-" mark should be wholly the work of " the Emperor of Russia; that it should " originate in his Imperial Majesty's " Councils; be conducted under his " auspices, and be concluded under his " guarantee."* With inflexible dignity, and indisputable propriety, that Monarch refused to interpose his good offices, to reconcile a difference occasioned by the aggression of those who still appeared determined to keep the plunder they had unjustly acquired.† After many fruitless applications, to obtain an interview with the Russian Minister, the British Ambassador received an official note which terminated his mission. In this the Emperor declares, "that he had of-" fered his mediation, in acquainting his " Britannic Majesty, that his desire was

* *Dispatch from Mr. Canning to Lord G. L. Gower, September,* 28, 1807.

† *See the conclusion of the dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower to Mr. Canning, 1st October,* 1807.

" to obtain for him *an honourable peace;*
" that England had rejected his offices,
" and that *it seemed as if her views were*
" *not to suffer the flames of war to be ex-*
" *tinguished, but to kindle them anew in*
" *the North, by an event sudden and no-*
" *vel.*"

After noticing, in strong terms of reprobation, the attack upon Denmark; expressing his resentment at the proposal made to him, that he should undertake to convince Denmark that it was for her interest to submit to what had recently befallen her, and adverting to other subjects of recrimination and complaint. The Russian Emperor declares, " that no arrangements shall take place " between Russia and England, *until the* " *latter shall have given satisfaction to* " *Denmark;* expresses his expectation " that his Britannic Majesty, *instead of* " *permitting his Ministers, as has lately* " *been the case, to scatter anew the seeds* " *of war,* would lend his assistance to " the conclusion of peace with France;

" when his Imperial Majesty would rea-
" dily renew with Great Britain the re-
" lations of friendship, which, consider-
" ing the dissatisfaction which the Em-
" peror so justly feels, he had, perhaps,
" already preserved too long."

On the transactions and documents here briefly stated, many important reflections arise. And in the first place, it will, perhaps, be thought remarkable, that a British Minister, in a negotiation of such a nature, should declare, that the *only chance of safety* for what remains of Europe, depends upon a good understanding between this country and Russia. Wretched, indeed, must now be the situation of Europe, if her only chance of safety depends upon the co-operation of Russia! But it is still more extraordinary, that Ministers, after avowing such an opinion, should have so contrived as to deprive us of that connexion, and to convert that very power, in whose assistance alone Europe,

and consequently we ourselves, had, it seems, any chance of safety, into an open and determined enemy. If the weight of Russia was necessary to be placed in the scale, to enable us to balance it with France with *any chance* of preponderance, what must be our situation now, when that weight is against us? What must add to our regret on this occasion is, that it might readily have been foreseen what would be the effect produced upon Europe in general, and particularly on Russia, by so violent and unexampled a measure as the attack upon Denmark;—a measure, founded not only upon a total disregard to the acknowledged relations of civilized states, but in an intire disbelief, or an open defiance, of all those feelings of humanity and justice, which even the calamitous events of the present times have not wholly extinguished among mankind.

Of the just censure which must eventually attach to the advisers and promoters of this precipitate measure, in a

political view, they are themselves, although too late, aware; and accordingly every effort is made by them to demonstrate, that the alienation of Russia from this country was not occasioned by the attack upon Denmark, but is wholly to be attributed to the previous successes of the French, and the treaty of Tilsit. How far these ideas may be confirmed by any papers which have not hitherto been laid before the public, it is impossible to determine; but it may safely be pronounced that they remain wholly unsupported by such as have been hitherto adduced; and that, on the contrary, these documents indisputably prove that the transactions which took place at Copenhagen were the direct and immediate cause of the final alienation of Russia from this country. Until that event, the British Ministry had not only met with attention and respect from the Russian Cabinet, but had been induced even to flatter themselves that they might avail themselves of this friendly dispo-

sition to such a degree, as to detach the Emperor from his engagements with France; but no sooner was the intelligence of the capture of Copenhagen received at Petersburgh, than a very different disposition on his part became manifest. Even in the Russian official note of the 1st September, which, although it purports to bear date *after* the intelligence of the surrender of Copenhagen *is said* to have arrived at Petersburg, was, from the nature of its contents, evidently written whilst the *investment* only of that place by the British arms was known,* the utmost anxiety is expressed

* See the official note from General Budberg to Lord G. L. Gower, dated 1st. Sep. 1807, in which it is said that "the English Fleet has taken a position "which evidently *announces intentions hostile towards* "*Denmark*;" a mode of expression which could scarcely have been used, had the intelligence of the assault and surrender of Copenhagen then arrived at Petersburgh.—The same idea is also confirmed by the British declaration against Russia, in which it is said, that "the only prospect of success in the endeavours of "His Majesty's Ambassador to restore the ancient "good understanding between Great Britain and Rus-

as to the consequences of that attack, and the Emperor does not scruple to represent the proceedings of the British Ministry, as "incompatible with the dignity "of every independent power." But no sooner did the final intelligence of the bombardment and surrender of Copenhagen arrive, than the indignation and resentment of the Emperor were manifested in the most unequivocal terms. A copy of the capitulation of Copenhagen was transmitted by Lord G. L. Gower to Count Romanzow, on the 17th September, accompanied by a short note, in which he expressed his hope that the capitulation might be followed by the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and Denmark. The reply of the Emperor, dated the 23d September, is conceived in terms of the highest displeasure. He declares, "that he has viewed "with infinite concern all the misfor-"tunes which have overwhelmed a mo-

"sia, appeared when the intelligence of the *siege* of "Copenhagen had been recently received at St. Pe-"tersburgh."

" narch, to whom he is attached by the " ties of blood, and those of a long " friendship; that the silence and reserve " of the British Ministry might serve " as a proof that they were themselves " persuaded that what they were under- " taking was directly contrary to the in- " terests of Russia; and that the Empe- " ror owed it to himself and to the in- " terests of his empire, not to shew him- " self insensible to it." From that moment the British Ambassador appears to have been treated by the Russian Ministry with a degree of coldness and neglect too apparent not to be felt; but which he seems willing to attribute to the interference of the French Minister, and the fear of the displeasure of Bonaparte. That our watchful enemy would not omit so favourable an opportunity of confirming the Russian Emperor in his enmity to Great Britain, may readily be believed; but after the transactions before stated, it will perhaps be thought that Lord G. L. Gower has scarcely done justice to his own penetration, when he

confesses, on the 4th November, " that " he is at a loss to find any satisfactory " explanation of the wish of the Rus- " sian Ministry to avoid communication " with him."

If it could be possible that any thing were wanting to shew that the attack upon Denmark was the real and substantial cause of the enmity of the Russian Emperor, it may be found in the authentic and solemn declaration of Lord Hutchinson; the man who by his heroic conduct in Egypt, supported the glory of the British army, upon an equality with that of her navy. This distinguished nobleman did not derive his information through any intermediate or inferior channel, but from the Russian Emperor himself, who openly communicated to him his sentiments respecting the attack upon Copenhagen, and the course of conduct which it had determined him to adopt. The particulars of this interview, as related by Lord Hutchinson in the House of Peers, are too recent, and

too deeply impressed upon the public mind, to render it necessary to recapitulate them, but the strong and indignant sense entertained by that monarch of the enormity of the conduct of the British Ministry towards Denmark, is such as might be expected from every just and honourable mind, and requires particular notice. After stating "the great concern which our unjustifiable conduct had given him," he added, "*that the French Government had never done any thing so strong.* That *it justified every thing they had done or might do hereafter.* If such proceedings were admissible, there was an end of all those relations which had usually influenced the conduct of nations towards each other; *that every body was at liberty to do just what they pleased,* and that he might attack Sweden to-morrow." To these observations he added, in the most peremptory language, tone, and manner, "*that he would have satisfaction, complete satisfaction, for this unprovoked aggression.*" In a former conversation the

Emperor had stated that he had been made acquainted by Bonaparte with the conditions of peace proposed to be offered to Great Britain, and that he had no doubt but that even Lord Hutchinson himself *would consider them to be highly reasonable and honourable.* His Lordship also avowed his opinion, "that "*the Emperor of Russia was sincere in* "*his desire to mediate, if possible, a* "*peace between this country and France;* "but at all events he believed *that the* "*relations of peace and amity might have* "*been preserved between Great Britain* "*and Russia.*" The only answer that has been attempted to be given to these assertions, is, that there was an impropriety in Lord Hutchinson's revealing the conversation that took place between him and the Emperor of Russia; as if the cause of truth were to be sacrificed to our etiquette with a power with whom we are now at war; or, as if the country were to receive its impression merely from the bold assertions and mutilated documents produced by Ministers; whilst

those honourable and noble persons, who, upon the most decisive grounds, felt the strongest conviction that such representations were unfounded, were not only to dispense with their own just vindication, but were, by their silence, to lend themselves as accomplices to such a delusion.

It is impossible to dismiss this subject without adverting to the very unfavourable impression which these transactions have made on the rest of Europe, as to the character and conduct of the British Ministry in their negotiations. From these documents it is evident, and on the part of Ministers it will not I presume be denied, that although the avowed object of deliberation between the British and Russian Ministry was to prepare the way for pacific negotiations, yet, when an opportunity seemed to offer for again involving Russia in hostility against France, it was eagerly seized on by the British Ministry, and their future co-operation was considered as *alone the*

proper subject of discussion between the two Governments. This line of conduct is perfectly in unison with the new principles attempted to be lately introduced into the moral and political code of this country; nor can it be doubted, that if Russia could have been induced to break her faith with France, and to join in a fresh attack upon her, the promoters of such an event would have conceived that they had attained the perfection of human wisdom.

From several expressions in the declarations of the Russian Emperor, it appears that he considered the British Ministry as not sincerely desirous of peace, but as availing themselves of every opportunity *to scatter anew the seeds of war.* In their justification it may perhaps be alleged that Great Britain had not positively consented to negotiate for peace, and that therefore there was nothing unjust in consulting whatever might appear to her to be for her own interest; that if Russia had violated the engagements so

recently entered into with France, the disgrace must have rested with herself, and not with Great Britain. On this it must be observed, that this is one of those cases, the decision of which will depend upon the preconceived opinions adopted by those who form a judgment upon it. To those who can justify the treacherous attack upon Copenhagen, the negotiation with Russia can require no apology; but to those who conceive that the character of a nation for honour and integrity is paramount to every other consideration, a disregard on the part of this country, of those principles upon which alone such a character can be supported, must occasion the most poignant regret. Is there then nothing criminal in endeavouring to prevail upon another person, or another state, to adopt a course of conduct confessedly treacherous, dishonourable, or criminal? Are treaties of peace only made for the moment? and can the party who has derived advantage and security from them have a right to discard them at pleasure? Is it allowable

to assert and to act upon such maxims? and can it be justifiable in the representative of a great and powerful nation, whilst he is ostensibly employed in laying the basis for pacific negotiations, to excite the power that offers its mediation to combine against that very state which has given an opening to such discussions? If such a course of conduct is to be justified, it can only be upon those new maxims which it has been the disgrace of the present day to have first openly avowed. To attempt to influence those who have the hardihood to assert them, by stating to them the obligations of society, or the laws of civilized states, is a hopeless task. To recall them to a sense of the over-ruling power of a Moral Providence moves only their derision. Let us then for once meet them upon their own ground. Let us discard all that has been obtained by the united wisdom of mankind through past ages; and let us see what the advocates of these new opinions would gain by demolishing all that has

been erected, and building their own superstructure in its stead. Let us take the instance before us, and suppose that Ministers had carried their object, and been able to combine Great Britain and Russia in a new and successful war against France. Would there then have been an end of human affairs? Would nothing have remained to be done when the present government of France was overthrown? Will no future negotiations ever be necessary? and is it of no importance to have given to the world a decisive proof that a war with Great Britain is less dangerous than a negotiation for peace, in which the proposed mediator is to be seduced, and the opportunity ostensibly devoted to the work of reconciliation is perverted to purposes wholly the reverse? The question is not, whether we shall excel our adversaries in the arts of negotiation, but whether we shall relinquish our national character for openness and integrity. Not whether we shall be able to excite a new and uncertain conflict on the continent

of Europe, but whether we shall lose the power of allaying it, when an unexpected result may require our interference. Not whether a Bonaparte or a Bourbon shall reign in France, but whether those principles upon which alone the tranquillity and happiness of the human race are founded, shall be overthrown or preserved. Destroy these principles in private life, and every man will suspect his neighbour; the whole order of society will be deranged; law will lose its influence, and violence and force will alone prevail. Discard them in public affairs, and the horrors of war will be multiplied; the soldier will degenerate into the assassin, and nation must be opposed in arms to nation, till one of them be exterminated.

But whatever opinion may be entertained of the conduct of the British Ministry in other respects, the result of this negotiation will indisputably shew how far the *pacific sentiments* so *uniformly avowed* by them were exemplified in their

conduct. The discussions were indeed entered upon with an apparent earnestness on their part, to be informed of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as preparatory to a further negotiation; but no sooner was a confidential intercourse established between the British Ambassador and the Russian Ministry, than these objects were wholly disregarded, and every effort made to engage Russia once more to take a decided part against France. Even since the avowal of hostilities on the part of Russia against this country, the objects which the British Ministers had in view have been acknowledged, as if for the purpose of exasperating France and Russia still further, in the declaration of the British Court in answer to that of Russia; in which we are told, that " His Majesty had enter-
" tained the hope, that a review of the
" transactions of that unfortunate nego-
" tiation (of Tilsit) and a just estimate
" of its effects upon the glory of the
" Russian name, and upon the interests
" of the Russian Empire, would have

" induced his Imperial Majesty to extri-
" cate himself from the embarrassment
" of those new councils and connexions,
" *which he had adopted in a moment of*
" *despondency and alarm*, and to return
" to a policy *more congenial to the princi-*
" *ples which he has so invariably pro-*
" *fessed*, and *more conducive to the ho-*
" *nour of his crown and to the prosperity*
" *of his dominions*."

The same circumstances which excited the resentment of Russia, appear also to have had a powerful effect on the Austrian Cabinet. But before the pacific relations between that Court and Great Britain were closed, another attempt was made, through the medium of that power, to open a negotiation for a general peace. On the 20th November, 1807, Prince Starhemberg, in the name of the Emperor of Austria, " officially
" and earnestly requests his Britannic
" Majesty, to declare his intentions, in
" evincing his disposition to enter into

"a negotiation for a maritime peace, "upon a basis suitable to the recipro- "cal interests of the powers who may "take a part in it."

In reply to this communication, his Majesty refers to the declaration which Mr. Canning, "*in the most regular and "authentic manner,* returned as an an- "swer to the official offer of Prince Star- "hemberg, in April," and expresses "*his surprise* at an application for a re- "newal of the declaration of sentiments, "of which the Court of Vienna *had "been so long and so formally in pos- "session.*"

Now, unless some transactions and communications have taken place, which have not been laid before Parliament, the surprise of the Austrian Court might at least be equal, on receiving such an answer, to that of the British Ministry. The latter had, in April, undertaken to *lose no time* in ascertaining the views of their allies. The Austrian Ambassador

waits from April till November; and, having during that interval heard nothing from the British Ministry on the subject, he then, by the directions of his Court, renews his proposition. After the expressions of his surprise, his Britannic Majesty adds, "that he will not "believe that any further declaration "can be necessary for the purpose of "proving to the nations of Europe, a "sincerity which the nations of Europe "cannot question."—An compliance, however, "with the wishes of a friend-"ly power, expressed with so much "earnestness and anxiety, His Majesty "is, nevertheless, *willing to repeat once* "*more* the assurance, *already so often* "*repeated*, that His Majesty is NOW, as "he *has at all times been*, prepared to "enter into negotiation, for the conclu-"sion of such a peace, as shall settle, "on equal terms, the respective inter-"ests of the powers engaged in the war, "as shall be consistent with His Ma-"jesty's fidelity to his allies, and shall

" provide for the tranquillity and se-
" curity of Europe."*

This answer, it must be observed, is, in its nature, essentially different from that given in April. In that, the British Ministry undertook previously to consult their allies, and declined all further measures until the sentiments of such allies were known; thereby wholly preventing the further interference of Austria. On the present occasion, the answer is *unconditional and explicit*, that his Majesty IS NOW *prepared to enter into negotiation.*

This answer appears to have been so understood by the Austrian Minister, who accordingly communicates it to the other belligerent powers, and having obtained their concurrence to a further negotiation, addresses himself again, *within the space of about five weeks*, to the Bri-

* *Note from Mr. Canning to the Prince de Starhemberg, 23d Nov.* 1807.

tish Ministry; acquainting them, that "*in consequence of the pacific dispositions* "*of his Britannic Majesty, announced in* "*the answer of the 23d November*, he is "charged to PROPOSE to the English Mi- "nistry, *to send immediately Plenipoten-* "*tiaries to Paris*, for the purpose of "treating for the establishment of peace "between all the powers at present at "war with England;" adding, "that, "this explicit and frank invitation *must* "*furnish a proof of the good faith, and of* "*the sincere intention* of France to put "an end to the calamities of war." At the same time, notifying, *that he was authorised by France to give passports* to the ministers whom the Cabinet of St. James's might appoint for that purpose.*

And here commence the difficulties of the British Ministry. Their note of the 23d November, expressed *an unconditional assent* to enter on a negotiation. Upon

* *Note from the Prince de Starhemberg to Mr. Canning, Jan. 1st.* 1808.

that the Austrian ambassador had acted; and had informed them, in reply, that the other parties were prepared to meet the British envoys. The British cabinet suffer seven days to elapse, and then complain that the Prince de Starhemberg " in stating himself to be charged " to propose to the British Government " the immediate sending of Plenipotentiaries to Paris, had omitted to explain " from whom he received that commission; whether from his Imperial " master, or from the government of " France. That if the former was the " case, Mr. Canning was commanded to " express his Majesty's concern, that " so little reference should appear to " have been had *to the correspondence* " *which had already taken place between* " *the courts of London and Vienna,* " on the subject of a negotiation for " peace."

On this it may with great justice be observed, that if the authority of the

Austrian ambassador had been questioned, it should have been on his first communication. By declaring to him their assent to negotiate, the British Ministry had virtually authorized him to communicate that assent to the belligerent powers. What other purpose could it indeed be intended to answer? They had not, as in April, *taken it upon themselves* to ascertain the intentions of any of the parties; but had left the affair in the hands of the Austrian minister, who within a reasonable time informs them of the result; and in order to prevent any misapprehension, *expressly refers to Mr. Canning's Letter of the 23d November,* as the ground of his subsequent proceedings.

The answer then proceeds in the following terms. "After so long an interval has been suffered to elapse since "the acceptance by his Majesty, *in April "last,* of the offer of his Imperial Majesty's mediation, his Majesty could "hardly have expected that the same

" offer should now be repeated; (if in-
" deed the Prince de Starhemberg's note
" is to be construed as a repetition of it,
" without any notification of the accept-
" ance of those *conditions*, which were, *at*
" *that time*, stated by his Majesty to be
" *indispensible preliminaries to the opening*
" *of a negotiation.*"

Now to what purpose can these remarks be introduced? On the 23d November the British Ministry declare that his Majesty *is prepared* to treat. The Austrian ambassador acts upon this assurance; and having gotten a place appointed for an interview, proposes to the British Ministry to send negotiators, to whom he is authorized to grant passports. Then comes the answer of the British Ministry, referring—not to his Majesty's *positive* assent to treat in November, but to his *conditional* one in April; and expressing great surprize that the Austrian minister should repeat his proposition, without any notification of the acceptance of *those conditions*, which

were, *at that time*, stated to be indispensible preliminaries to the opening a negotiation. Was it then to be expected that the Austrian minister would recur to conditions which the British Ministry had themselves neglected to repeat, and which must, in their nature, be essentially changed, by the alterations which had, in the intermediate time, taken place in the character of the war, and the relations of the different Potentates of Europe? But independant of this consideration, what had the Austrian minister to do with the circumstances referred to by the British Ministry in April? Did it rest with him to consult the allies of Great Britain whether they were disposed to peace? or had not the British Ministry expressly taken that task upon themselves? Did they ever communicate the result of this to Austria? If not, how can they charge the minister of that power with having been the cause of delaying the negotiation, and with "suffering so long an in-" terval to elapse after his Majesty's ac-

"ceptance of the mediation in April?" After having defeated the proposed negotiation in April, it is certainly too much to reproach the Austrian ambassador, or his court, with having been negligent on the subjec; a reproach which appears to have been made with no other view, than to frustrate, under some plausible pretext, the new measures taken by that minister for bringing the parties to deliberate together on the terms of peace; in which it seems he had not been *too indolent*, but *too hasty;* and having conceived that the British cabinet, in their note of the 23d November, were sincere, had taken the proper measures to carry what they professed to be the wishes of his Majesty, into complete effect.

After a long disquisition on the insufficiency of the powers of the Austrian ambassador for entering on such a negotiation; a defect which might doubtless have been immediately and effectually removed, another objection is stated by

the British Ministry to their entering on the proposed negotiation, in the following terms.

" The proposal to his Majesty to send " negotiators to Paris, unaccompanied as " it is with any ostensible and unequi- " vocal return on the part of France, for " the declarations already made in his " Majesty's name, is *so far from being a* " *proof of any such reciprocal disposition,* " that it can be construed no otherwise " by His Majesty, than *as implying an* " *unjustifiable doubt of the sincerity of* " *his Majesty's professions.*"

On perusing this passage one is at a loss to conceive upon what possible grounds it can be justified. When two countries are at war, and a proposition has been made to each of them by a neutral state, to enter upon a pacific negotiation; when that proposition has been accepted by one of them, and such acceptance has been communicated by the mediating power to

the other, who then desires that ambassadors may be appointed to enter upon the consideration of the subject, is there any thing extraordinary, or informal, in such a proceeding? or is it not, in common apprehension and common sense, the only reasonable plan that the parties can adopt for effecting their purpose? No, says Mr. Canning; as His Majesty has given a pledge of his own pacific dispositions, it is requisite that a pledge, equally solemn and authentic, should be given by France, *before his Majesty can be called upon to make any further advance.* Was not the wish expressed by the French government, that the British cabinet would send negotiators, a pledge? Was not the authority given by France to the Austrian ambassador to furnish such negotiators with passports, a pledge? and are not *acts* of more authenticity than *professions?* But what follows is yet more extraordinary. It is not sufficient for the British Ministry to assert that the invitation to send ambassadors affords *no pledge* that the French are de-

sirous of entering upon a negotiation, but it is on the contrary to be considered as a *positive insult*, "and can be con-"strued no otherwise by His Majesty, "than as implying an unjustifiable doubt "of the sincerity of His Majesty's profes-"sions." What! does the express invitation to His Britannic Majesty to send ambassadors, imply *an unjustifiable doubt of his sincerity?* How then could the French government have testified their belief that His Majesty was sincere? Surely causes of rejection and of repulsion must have been difficult to discover, when the very act, which of all others manifests the conviction of the French government that the British Ministry are sincere, is selected as a new ground of offence, and adduced as a proof of *an unjustifiable suspicion on their part of the sincerity of His Majesty's professions.*

Mr. Canning then proceeds to inform the Austrian ambassador, "that His Ma-"jesty is willing to treat with France; "but he will treat only on a footing of

" perfect equality. That he is ready " to treat with the allies of France; but " the negotiation must equally embrace " the interests of the allies of Great " Britain."

" That as soon as the basis of negoti- " ation shall have been satisfactorily as- " certained, and an unexceptionable place " of negotiation agreed upon, His Majesty " will be prepared to name Plenipoten- " tiaries to meet those of the other pow- " ers engaged in the war; but His Ma- " jesty will not again consent to send " his Plenipotentiaries to a hostile ca- " pital."

These paragraphs, separated from their context, are such as would probably have been considered by the Austrian minister as a satisfactory answer; but when combined with what precedes and what follows, cannot be adopted as the ground of any proceeding whatever. Whilst the British Ministry still insist *that reference shall be had to the conditional answer given*

by them in April, as containing propositions indispensible to the opening a negotiation; whilst His Majesty *still conceives, that an unjustifiable doubt is entertained of his sincerity,* how is it possible to found any measures on the more conciliatory sentiments here avowed? Lest however the Austrian minister, finding in the same note a great variety of discordant matter, should, in his zeal to promote his object, think himself justifiable in selecting only such as might suit the purposes of reconciliation; lest he should apply again to the French government and obtain a confirmation of his powers, a more explicit avowal of their pacific disposition, a statement of the basis of the treaty, or a change in the place proposed for the theatre of negotiation, the British Secretary of State concludes his very extraordinary note, with an effectual prohibition against the further interference of the Austrian ambassador; informing him, "that His Majesty had not directed him "to give *any authority* to the Prince de "Starhemberg *to speak in the name of His*

"*Majesty to the government of France.*"* This reply closed the discussion. Nothing further could indeed remain to be said. A few days afterwards the Prince de Starhemberg demanded his passports; and England and Austria are now at war.

Such have been the circumstances that have attended, and such the fate, of the three distinct offers made to Great Britain in the course of the year 1807, for opening negotiations for peace. The first of them appears to have been frustrated by the British Ministry having undertaken to consult the wishes of their allies and to communicate the result to Austria; a promise, of the performance of which no evidence has yet been adduced, and the neglect of which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by those changes in the political state of Europe which did not take place till some

* *Note from Mr. Canning to the Prince de Starhemberg, January* 8, 1808.

time afterwards. In the second negotiation, in which Russia offered herself as a mediator, the British Ministry, instead of availing themselves of the friendly disposition manifested by that Court, to promote pacific negotiations and obtain more honourable terms of peace, were intent only on improving that disposition to excite a new combination against France; until our attack upon Denmark roused the resentment of the Russian sovereign, and instead of a friend and mediator, rendered him our exasperated and determined enemy. With respect to the third proposition; whatever construction may be put upon the pacific asseverations and irrelevant objections with which the answer of the British Ministry abounds, the *positive refusal* to authorize the Austrian Minister "*to speak in the name of His Majesty to the government of France*," operated as a decisive negative to all further proceedings, and might alone have been sufficient for that purpose, without the observations by

which it is preceded, and which are so palpably open to fair and candid remark. Whether ministers are right in thus declining to enter upon negotiations for peace, when so many opportunities have occurred, is not the question. The object of the present inquiry is only to shew how far the conduct of ministers in these transactions has been consistent with the convictions they have expressed, and the professions they have so repeatedly made, "*that it was not only their duty,* "*but their interest, to secure peace as soon* "*as possible, upon safe and honourable* "*grounds*, AND THAT THEY HAD MISSED NO "FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO EFFECT IT;"* and how far their friends and supporters are justified, in recommending to the country a further reliance in those assurances, and in representing petitions for peace as not only "*unnecessary* but *mischievous*, and

* Such is reported as the language of Mr. Canning, in the House of Commons, on Colonel Stanley presenting the petition for peace of the inhabitants of Bolton, 22d February, 1808.

" in effect, AS PETITIONS FOR THE PRO-
" LONGATION OF THE WAR."†

But it may probably be asked, if the present policy of the British Cabinet has determined them to continue the war, what should prevent them from openly avowing such determination, and what occasion can there be to elude by so much circumlocution, and so many evasions, the pacific proposals made by the enemy? Would it not, it may be asked, be much more manly, much more honourable, much more consistent with the character of Great Britain, to reject these insufficient pretexts, and to avow the determination, *that England will not negotiate for peace with France?* Undoubtedly it would be more dignified, and more consistent with those professions of frankness and good faith so frequently made in the course

† See the Address to the inhabitants of Manchester before referred to in p. 6.

of the correspondence by the British Ministry; but a little consideration will shew that this is a line of conduct which ministers cannot ostensibly adopt. What the consequences might be, if Great Britain were openly to avow sentiments of inextinguishable hostility against the states with which she is now at war, it is not easy to calculate. To the great tribunal of public opinion, some deference is due; and the manifestation of such a disposition, and the course of conduct to which it must lead, could only cause this Country to be considered as the common enemy of the rest of the world. But independent of foreign powers, there are formidable objections at home against such a bold and decisive measure. Were ministers explicitly to refuse all offers of negotiation, it would open the eyes of the people to their real situation. They would then clearly perceive, that the long unvaried track of hostility in which they are called upon to persevere, can only terminate in their ruin; and that if

they escape a sudden destruction, from the rocks and precipices which they must at every step encounter, they must eventually perish from the very fatigue and difficulty of the journey. That the heavy burthens and taxations to which they submit shall never be relaxed; that the personal sacrifices which the war requires must not only be continued, but increased; that whole classes of society, the pride, and strength, and hope of the country, must quit their pacific and useful occupations, and devote themselves to a military life; and all this because ministers refuse to listen to *any proposals of pacification*, could scarcely be expected to be silently submitted to, and would indeed require a prostration of intellect upon which ministers themselves would hardly presume. A different policy is therefore necessary. The offers of reconciliation, so repeatedly and earnestly made, are not to be directly and ostensibly rejected; but our acceptance of them is to be postponed, *till we learn the sentiments of our allies*, objections

are to be raised, as to *the authority of the minister by whom they are made*, or to the *irregular and hasty manner of his proceeding;* and those circumstances which to common apprehension are the most decisive proofs of a pacific disposition on the part of our enemy, are to be converted into additional causes of offence, and represented as evidence of *an unjustifiable suspicion of our sincerity*. Hence the country is led to believe that the continuance of the war is to be attributed to no other cause than the bad faith, prevarication, animosity and obstinacy of the enemy. In this idea they are industriously confirmed by every art which those who delight in war and fatten upon its spoils can devise. It is to no purpose that ministers have precluded themselves and the country from the knowledge of *any proposals which our enemies are inclined to make*, by interdicting or avoiding all discussion. Their expectations and demands, although unknown, are still represented as in the highest degree unjust and exorbitant, and

as requiring from us a total surrender of our honour and our interest, our commercial prosperity and our maritime rights; and even the attempt to explain to us such demands, is considered by us as only adding insult to injury. By a kind of magnetic repulsion, the nearer they approach the further we fly. The result of every attempt at pacification only renders pacification less probable. Formerly we had some assignable reasons of hostility, which, however weak and futile, served at least to mark the limit of our sacrifices and the bound of our labours; but these are now discarded as useless pretexts. Such, we are told, is the violence and ambition of the enemy, such his determination to be satisfied with nothing short of our entire destruction, that *we must now dismiss all ideas of peace*, and resort as our only security, to a PERPETUAL WAR. We contemplate such a state of society as if it were long possible; as if in the continual fluctuation of human affairs, war alone could be

eternal; as if the period must not arrive, when ONE OF THE TWO NATIONS by whom such a sentiment is avowed, MUST INCUR INEVITABLE DESTRUCTION AS A STATE, AND SUBMIT TO THE WILL OF THE OTHER!

If, in the course of the preceding pages, I have in any degree accomplished the objects which I had in view; if I have demonstrated, not only *that no satisfactory proof has as yet been given that a just, honourable, and advantageous peace is not attainable*, but that even the proposals successively made to the British Ministry for a negotiation, have either been *postponed, eluded*, or *perverted* to the purposes of exciting fresh hostility; if this has been done with any degree of conviction, I would now venture to ask those acknowledged friends to peace, who have been of opinion that it is not advisable for the people to express their sentiments on that subject by addresses or petitions to the sovereign, what measures they would advise the

country to take at such a juncture? At the time those opinions were first avowed, they were perhaps more defensible than at present. Rumours of a negotiation prevailed in the country, the particulars of which were not known beyond the cabinet, and it was not until the meeting of Parliament, that the public had an opportunity of forming a judgment on the subject. But now, when the attention of an hour will explain to the most indolent capacity all that ministers allow us to know of these discussions, it may reasonably be expected, that every difference of opinion amongst the friends of peace, will be effectually removed. That finding every other hope frustrated, every other prospect of reconciliation closed, every doubt as to the intention of Ministers dispelled, the dispassionate part of the community will resort to the only constitutional mode in their power, and express their sentiments to their sovereign, in those loyal and dutiful terms which he will not refuse to hear. Is it asserted as an objection to these

measures, that it would be impolitic to let our enemies know the real situation of the country? I scruple not to aver, that whatever that situation may be, it is more injurious to this country to make such an assertion, than it is openly to acknowledge the evil. Are we then to tell our enemies, in express terms, that our situation is such that we must labour to conceal it from them? That we have already arrived at such a state of disease, that we dare not probe the wound? By the constitution of these realms, it is the right of the people to petition their Sovereign, and if that right is not to be exercised on an emergency like the present, when is it likely to be of any use? But the paramount consideration on this, as on all similar subjects, is, that it is always desirable that the truth should be known, and that all endeavours to conceal it are only the result of that narrow policy, which, in attempting to impose upon others, imposes only on itself. That these faithful representations of the public mind will

contain any sentiments derogatory to the honour of the crown, or the invincible spirit of the people, it would be a libel upon the country to suppose. The purport of them is not, as has been falsely and absurdly represented, that Great Britain should humiliate herself to her enemies, and should stain her honour and compromise her interests by the acceptance of any terms which might be unworthy of a great and powerful nation. Their object is to express the desire of the petitioners that an opening may still be left for negotiation; that any opportunities that may in future present themselves of entering upon pacific discussions, and ascertaining the terms upon which peace may be concluded, may not, like those which have already occurred, be neglected, or perverted to other purposes; and that if such terms be found consistent with the dignity of the British Sovereign, and the interests of his people, if they should be calculated to confirm to us our possessions, to establish

our just rights, to afford a wide scope for national exertion, to remove as much as possible the causes of future warfare, and finally to satisfy that sense of national honour which is no less essential to the true interests than to the character of the country, that then, and then only, such terms of pacification should be acceded to.

Nor let it be supposed that these loyal manifestations of the state of the country and of the feelings of the people, will for one moment relax or interfere with that patriotic spirit, and that unanimity of action, which are requisite for the defence of the country and the vigorous prosecution of the war. The people well know that this is a duty which is paramount to all other considerations; that it admits of no qualifications; is affected by no misconduct of ministers; and ceases but with life itself. Wretched indeed would be our condition, if the high and honourable performance of this indispensable duty were not perfectly consistent with that freedom of opinion

on all political subjects, and particularly on the objects and consequences of war, and on the measures of ministers, which by our birth right as Britons we enjoy; and they who presumptuously stigmatize the free exercise of this inestimable privilege with the mark of disloyalty or disaffection, are not only unworthy of such a privilege, but are the real promoters of that disunion which they affect to deprecate, and would, if they could succeed in their efforts to silence the free expression of the public mind, deprive the friends and defenders of their country, of all that renders it worth veneration and worth defence.

To enter upon pacific discussions without a real desire of bringing them to a successful termination, can however be of no avail. We have already seen with what ease the offers even for opening a negotiation may be eluded; and we cannot doubt that if there be not a sincere and mutual desire of reconciliation, innumerable circumstan-

ces may occur in the course of any negotiation, which may afford a plausible pretext for defeating the object which the parties profess to have in view. To the people at large it is indifferent to what administration they may be indebted for the restoration of tranquillity; but it must be acknowledged that His Majesty's present Ministers have shewn no substantial indications that they are actuated by any spirit of conciliation, and that the declarations of their pacific intentions have been strongly contrasted by their conduct, as often as any opportunity has occurred of putting them to the test. On the other hand, the tendency of their councils to enlarge the theatre and extend the ravages of war, seems no less manifest than their aversion to peace. At the time when they came into power, the difficulties and dangers under which this country laboured from her powerful adversaries, were deeply felt and generally acknowledged; but during the short period of their administration, those difficulties have been increased, and

those adversaries have been more than doubled, both in number and in strength. Nations which were then firmly united with us in a common cause, have been alienated, and converted into enemies; those which before were neutral, have, by imprudent, unjust, and violent measures, been thrown into the arms of France; and, as if it were not sufficient to have exasperated all Europe against us, we have by our rash and inconsiderate proceedings, and particularly by the impolitic tenor of the late Orders in Council, given rise to a spirit of animosity between this country and America, the consequences of which cannot fail to be highly injurious and dangerous to both. That the alienation of our continental allies may, in a great degree, be attributed to the extraordinary successes of Bonaparte, may readily be admitted; but the final extinction of all friendly intercourse, and the present hostility between this country and the principal Northern Powers, is the unhappy result of our own misconduct and violence;

and even those successes which have overthrown every continental barrier against the ambition of Bonaparte, may fairly be attributed to the manifest indisposition and neglect, on the part of the British Ministry, to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the offer of Austria, in the month of April, 1807, for terminating hostilities, and preventing the further ravages of war.

How far it is probable that after the repeated overtures for negotiation made, either directly or indirectly to this country by the present Ruler of France, he may be inclined to renew such an application it is difficult to say. Having so frequently declared in the face of Europe his willingness to enter upon a negotiation, and having solicited the mediation of other powers for that purpose, it is possible that he may expect that the next offer should originate with us. Nor can it be contended that such a manifestation can, under due precautions, be derogatory to the honour

of any country; for if such an idea were universally to prevail, all wars must be interminable. On the contrary, the frequent rejection of the propositions made to us, now calls upon us to be the first to make a pacific advance. In the eyes of the rest of the world, which has so long suffered under the calamities of war, such a measure, instead of being degrading, would appear highly honourable to this country, and one of the leading members of His Majesty's present administration, has asserted in specific terms, "that *at any time when negotiation is desirable,* he cannot conceive that any delicacy as to which party should make the proposal ought to stand in the way."* It is easy, however, to foresee, that against any proceeding of this nature, it will be loudly asserted, that *this is not the time for* pacific overtures; an observation which the

* Mr. Canning's speech on the negotiation with France in 1806.

supporters of the war system have been equally ready to make, ever since its commencement, whenever such overtures have been proposed. According to their ideas the most improper time to enter on negotiations, is always that in which they appear to be the most loudly called for by the country, and the most strongly recommended by every consideration of expediency, of propriety, and of interest. In opposition, however, to these sentiments, it may with great confidence be observed, that the present is, *of all others*, the most proper time to enter upon pacific discussions. To say nothing of the operation of the war, as it affects the condition of different classes of our fellow subjects, we cannot fail to observe that a new scene is now opening upon us. An essential change has taken place in the general aspect and affairs of Europe. We now for the first time find ourselves engaged in a war without an ally who can render us the least assistance, or rather, who will not be an ad-

ditional incumbrance and expense to us; and have to enter upon an untried contest, perfectly novel to the history of this country, which has long been accustomed to carry on its warfare rather by the means of its allies than by its own physical resources and military strength. Besides our European foes, it seems not improbable that a short time may give us another beyond the Atlantic; and with the increase of our enemies we may reasonably apprehend the diminution of our trade, and the defalcation of our public revenue. This then seems of all others to be the period at which we ought to pause. Whether or not we are to plunge into such a new and unexampled contest, may yet, perhaps, rest in some degree on our own decision; and certainly a more awful subject was never proposed to the deliberation of any country.—That any negotiation which might be opened would terminate in the establishment of peace cannot indeed be positively asserted; but at all events it would enable

us to ascertain in some degree the views of the enemy; and would tend either to realize, or to remove, those ideas so generally entertained in this country of the intentions of Bonaparte to infringe upon its honour, its interests, or its rights. If these apprehensions should be dissipated by any proposals which he might make, the way to pacification would then be prepared; if, on the contrary, they should be confirmed, every difference of opinion in this country, as to the expediency or practicability of peace, would be effectually removed; and every possible privation would not only be chearfully submitted to, but the temporary calamities incident to any portion of our fellow subjects, who may be more particularly liable to suffer from the effects of long protracted hostilities, or by the loss of commercial intercourse, would doubtless be alleviated by the liberality of the more wealthy part of the community, or the timely aid of the nation at large. If, however, we should be

compelled by the ambitious views and unreasonable demands of our adversary to continue the war, let our efforts be directed by magnanimity and public spirit, supported by prudence and economy, and above all, let us endeavour to reconcile the world to our cause by conducting ourselves with integrity, with strict adherence to good faith, and with inviolable justice. It is by such means, and by such means only, that we can hope to render any war either popular or successful. To stain the honour, to degrade the character, and to violate the good faith of the nation; to attempt either to secure ourselves, or to annoy our enemies, by acts of cruelty, of treachery, and of injustice, unauthorized by the general laws of society, and the practice of civilized states, is to acknowledge that we can no longer rely on the virtue, energy, and courage, which have hitherto distinguished and preserved this country through all her difficulties; it is to render ourselves the just objects of resent-

ment, of dread, and of abhorrence, to the rest of the world, and cannot fail to accelerate that ruin which must be the unavoidable consequence of that debasement of public spirit, and of private virtue, to which such a course of conduct cannot fail to give rise.

POSTSCRIPT.

PERHAPS there never was an instance of a more gross and unfounded calumny than in a recent attempt to asperse the memory, and impeach the veracity of the late Mr. Fox, by insinuating that the proposal made to him respecting the assassination of the French Ruler, as related by him in his letter to M. Talleyrand, was a story fabricated by himself, for the purpose of bringing on a negociation with France. The more immediate friends of Mr. Fox have disdained to take any public notice of the false assertions, and scandalous imputations to which I allude; and I can scarcely suppose that any of my readers require further evidence than what is contained in Mr. Fox's letter, of a fact, with regard to which his character and veracity are opposed to the malicious and wanton accusations which have been made against him. But that no possible doubt may hereafter remain as to this transaction, and for the entire refutation of these slanders, I think it incumbent upon me to state, from indisputable authority, that

there exists evidence, in documents at the Alien Office, of the arrival at Gravesend, of the person named and described in Mr. Fox's letter; of his application from that place for an audience with Mr. Fox; of his private interview with that Gentleman at his house in Arlington-street; of Mr. Fox's order, in the first instance, to send the Frenchman out of the kingdom, and of his subsequent revocation of that order; in consequence of which, the intended assassin was detained in custody three weeks, and was then embarked at Harwich, on board a vessel bound for Husum. When to these particulars it is added, that the person who accompanied the Frenchman to the interview with Mr. Fox, and who acted under his directions in the measures taken for sending him out of the kingdom, was Mr. Brooke, who yet holds the same situation in the Alien Office, as he did under the administration of Mr. Fox, I trust it will be wholly unnecessary for me to state any thing further in vindication of that distinguished character, against so malignant and foul a charge.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

STATE PAPERS

AND

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

I.—CORRESPONDENCE WITH AUSTRIA.

Note from the Count de Starhemberg to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated London, April 18th, 1807.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, having resolved upon offering to the principal Powers interested in the present war his amicable mediation, in order by his intervention, to bring on a Negociation for Peace, the Count de Starhemberg, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, has received Orders to transmit to the Ministry of His Britannic Majesty, the accompanying Note, containing the offer of mediation which His Imperial and Royal Majesty has caused to be presented in the same manner, and at the same time, to the Cabinets of Petersburgh and of the Thuilleries, as well as to that of Berlin. In acquitting himself of this commission, the Undersigned requests his Excellency Mr. Canning will have the goodness to lay this offer of mediation of His Imperial Majesty before the King of England, and he ventures to hope, that his Excellency will not refuse to inform him, as soon as possible, of the resolutions taken by His Britannic Majesty on this subject.

The Count de Starhemberg embraces this opportunity to renew to his Excellency the assurance of his high consideration.—London, April 18th, 1807.

(Note referred to in the foregoing.)

(Translation.)

The Emperor Francis II. could not behold without the deepest concern, the rupture which took place last

Autumn, between His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and His Majesty the King of Prussia; and he was shortly afterwards still more painfully affected, by the extension of hostilities over a considerable part of Europe. If, by observing a strict and scrupulous impartiality from the very commencement of the war, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty has had the satisfaction to maintain his system of neutrality in circumstances so critical, and to preserve his people from the ravages of war, he did not enter the less fully into the miseries which were multiplied around his states; and in his just solicitude for the tranquillity and the security of his monarchy, he could not but be sensible to the continually renewed alarms upon his frontiers, or to the fatal effects which they inevitably produced in various branches of his interior administration. The Emperor, uniformly animated with the same dispositions, has had no other view, from the commencement, and during the course of hostilities, than to endeavour to bring about a reconciliation, and to avail himself of every proper opportunity to put an end to the calamities of war; he judged he could not better effect this desirable result than by constantly impressing the Belligerent Powers with his sentiments of moderation and of conciliation, and in giving his whole attention towards producing in them a similar disposition. The reception which his first overtures to this effect have obtained, appears to announce, that the moment of so desirable a reconciliation is not far distant. In the confidence inspired by so consolatory a prospect, the general welfare and the interest of his own dominions call upon His Imperial Majesty to offer to the Belligerent Powers his friendly intervention; and in consequence of this, he does not hesitate to make to His Britannic Majesty, the offer of his mediation, and of his good offices.

But, in considering how very complicated and extensive the present war is become, the Emperor would think that he had but imperfectly expressed his fervent desire for peace, and the hope of its complete and

speedy re-establishment, if he did not, at the same time state the entire conviction he feels, that it is only by the united endeavours of the Powers principally concerned in the war, and by a negociation in common, which should embrace the whole of their reciprocal interests, that permanent tranquillity and a secure and solid peace can be attained, a peace which should secure the future political relations of Europe.

His Imperial Majesty, from that firm persuasion (which the frankness of his sentiments will not permit him to dissemble) conceives that this pacific overture should be made by him in common to those Cabinets which are, in the first instance, to take a part in the conferences; and it is therefore with earnestness that he equally invites the Cabinets of Petersburgh, of Berlin, and of the Thuilleries, to adopt the same conciliatory views, and to enter into negociations for a peace, in which the essential relations of all the parties interested should, as far as is practicable, be combined.

The emperor has thus generally testified his wish for peace. He will not take upon himself to suggest the particular mode of negociation, and still less to anticipate the intentions of other Powers, or to decide upon those measures which it may be thought necessary previously to settle, in order to determine the principles of the preliminary overtures between the Belligerent Powers.

Nevertheless, in the hope that this friendly offer of his interposition will be appreciated in such a manner as the rectitude of his intentions authorises him to expect, His Imperial Majesty is eager to propose (in order that the opening of negociations may be facilitated by his good offices) any place in his dominions, the situation and locality of which might be reciprocally convenient, and which, from this consideration, ought not to be too near the theatre of war; and, in this respect, as in every other point, the Emperor will feel pleasure in contributing to accelerate the period of so desirable a meeting.

(Signed) LOUIS COMTE DE STARHEMBERG.

London, 18*th April*, 1807.

Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to the Count de Starhemberg, dated April 25, 1807.

The Undersigned, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has laid before the King his Master the Note delivered to him by the Count de Starhemberg, Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, in which his Imperial Majesty offers himself as the mediator of a general peace.

The Undersigned has received the orders of the King to transmit to the Count de Starhemberg the inclosed official answer to the Note of His Imperial Majesty. Rendering the fullest justice to the motives which have actuated His Imperial Majesty, in the proposal of such a mode of negociation, as can alone, by embracing the interests of all parties, conduce to the establishment of a solid peace, and to the permanent tranquillity of Europe, the King accepts, so far as His Majesty is concerned, the offer of His Imperial Majesty's Mediation, subject only to the condition of a like acceptance of it on the part of all the other Powers who are engaged in the present war.

In executing this duty, the Undersigned is happy to seize the opportunity of renewing to the Count de Starhemberg the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

Foreign Office, April 25, 1807.

Official Note, referred to in the foregoing.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, has received, with a just sense of the consideration which is due to every communication from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and of the motives by which, on this occasion, His Imperial Majesty has been actuated, the offer of his Imperial Majesty to become the mediator of a general peace.

The King, who has never ceased to consider a secure and durable peace as the only object of the war in which His Majesty is engaged, and who has never

refused to listen to any suggestions which appeared likely to conduce to the attainment of that object, cannot hesitate to declare his entire concurrence in the opinion expressed by the Emperor and King that a peace of such a description is only to be attained through negociations which shall be common to all the Powers principally engaged in the war.

To such negociations, whenever the consent of the other Powers interested in them shall be obtained, the King will willingly accede; and His Majesty will lose no time in communicating with such of those Powers as are connected with him by the bonds of amity and confidential intercourse, for the purpose of ascertaining their views; and if those views shall be favourable to His Imperial Majesty's proposal, of concerting with them the mode in which such negociations should be opened, and of agreeing upon the principles which (according to the suggestion of His Imperial Majesty, it might be expedient previously to establish as the basis and foundation of a general discussion and arrangement.

With respect to the place which should be selected as the seat of the negociations, His Majesty would not object to any place which, in addition to the indispensable qualification, proposed in the note of His Imperial Majesty, of being sufficiently remote from the immediate influence of the events of the war, should have that of affording to His Majesty, in an equal degree with all the other Powers concerned, the opportunity of a prompt and uninterrupted communication with the Plenipotentiaries who should be appointed to represent His Majesty at the Congress.

GEORGE CANNING.

Foreign Office, April 25, 1807.

Copy of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning to Mr. Adair, His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary Minister and Plenipotentiary to the Court of Vienna, dated April 28, 1807.

SIR,

I herewith inclose to you for your information, the copies of two Notes which I have received from Count

Starhemberg, and of the answers which, by His Majesty's command, I have returned to them. If any communications should be made to you by the Austrian Government on the subject to which these inclosures relate, you will not fail to forward them hither by the mode of conveyance which may appear to you to be the most secure and expeditious.

Extract of a Dispatch from Robert Adair, Esq. to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Vienna, May 20, 1807.

SIR,

I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your dispatches of 28th ult. together with their inclosures.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning to the Earl of Pembroke, dated May 15, 1807.

His Majesty has accepted, unequivocally, so far as he is himself concerned, the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Austria, subject only to the condition of its being equally accepted by all the other Powers principally engaged in the war.

The Note received from Count Starhemberg, and the answer, which, by His Majesty's command, I returned to it, are herewith inclosed for your Lordship's information.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Earl of Pembroke to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated July 8th, 1807.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that I arrived at Vienna on the 3d instant, and that I lost no time in requesting a conference with Count Stadion, at which I was precluded from making any progress in the object of my mission, owing to the accounts received of an armistice having taken place between Russia and France; to which, though not official, the Count gave credit.

II.—CORRESPONDENCE WITH RUSSIA.

Note from General Budberg to his Excellency Lord Granville Leveson Gower, dated June 1807.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Accept my best thanks for the promptitude with which you had the goodness to transmit to me the dispatches which I have received, together with your Excellency's letter of the 11th (23d) instant. The reports which your Lordship mentions are well founded. On the 9th (21st) instant an armistice was concluded, which was yesterday ratified by both parties. The two armies remain nearly in the same positions, and hostilities will not recommence until a month after the denunciation of the armistice. Sensible that it is of the utmost importance to you, to transmit this intelligence as speedily as possible to your Court, I lose not an instant in re-dispatching the Messenger whom your Excellency has sent to me.

In respect, my Lord, to the interview which you request of me, it would give me great pleasure to comply with your wishes, if it were possible for me to foresee at what place the Emperor will stay even for a few days; but as we are still upon our journey, I must wait for the first opportunity of taking His Imperial Majesty's commands, in order to invite you to rejoin me, where I may then be.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) A. DE BUDBERG.

Note from his Excellency Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to General Budberg, dated Memel, 16th (28th) June, 1807.

(Translation.)

General,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of the intelligence of the armistice which was signed on the 21st of this month, and although I implicitly confide in your Excel-

lency's assurances, I cannot pass over in silence the prospect of a solid and permanent peace, which, from the tenor of your public letter to the Governor of Riga, your Excellency appears to believe will be the result of that measure.

The reciprocal engagements between the Courts of London and St. Petersburgh, the known principles and the firmness of His Imperial Majesty, the verbal assurances of the Emperor, which I have just transmitted to the King my Master, were so many pledges, that it is not now a question (according to public rumour) to negociate for a separate peace, but for a general one; and whatever doubts I may have entertained on this subject, your Excellency's letter to General Buxhovden has completely done away. The just and enlightened manner in which your Excellency views the situation of Europe, convinces me that you could not expect a peace would be either firm or lasting, which did not include every power at war, and which was not founded upon an equitable basis. My Court will be ready to concur in negociations so formed, since it made war for the sole purpose of obtaining a secure and permanent peace. But your Excellency will nevertheless permit me to express all the regret I feel, at being still unable to make known to my Government the basis upon which it is proposed to ground negociations. At the moment when negociation is carrying on with the enemy, it is most essential that unlimited confidence should subsist between the Allied Powers. Upon this principle it is that the Court of London has ever acted, and it would be superfluous to recal to your Excellency the eagerness testified by the British Ministry last year to communicate to the Russian Ambassador the whole of the correspondence with the French Government. I wait with impatience your Excellency's summons to repair to His Majesty. Nothing can afford me greater pleasure than to repeat in person the assurances of the esteem and high consideration with which I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's, &c.
(Signed) G. L. GOWER.

Note from General Budberg, to his Excellency Lord Granville Leveson Gower, dated Tilsit, June 18, (30,) 1807.

(Translation.)

SIR, AND AMBASSADOR,

I have received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour of addressing to me yesterday; and, having laid it before the Emperor, my august Master, I hasten to transmit to you the answer which His Imperial Majesty has commanded me to return to it.

The firmness and perseverence with which His Majesty, during eight months, maintained and defended a cause which he had reason to suppose common to all Sovereigns, are the most certain pledges of the intentions which animated him, as well as of the loyalty and purity of his principles.

Never would His Imperial Majesty have thought of deviating from that system which he has hitherto pursued, if he had been supported by a real assistance on the part of his Allies.

But having, from the separation of Austria and of England, found himself reduced to his own forces, having to combat with the forces of France united to the immense means of which she has the disposal, and in the critical position at which affairs had arrived, His Majesty was authorised in believing, that by continuing to sacrifice himself for others, he would ultimately incur a risk of compromising the safety of his own empire, without being enabled to hope that he might ever fulfil the original object of this war.

The conduct which your Government has held, during these latter times, is moreover of a nature completely to justify the determination which the Emperor has now taken. The diversion on the Continent which England has so long since promised, has not, to this day, taken place; and if even, according to the latest advices from London, it would appear, that the British Ministry has at length decided on ordering the depar-

ture of ten thousand men to Pomerania, that succour is in no wise proportioned, either to the hopes which we were authorised in entertaining, or to the importance of the object to which these troops were intended to be destined.

The pecuniary succours which England constantly afforded to the powers of the Continent at war with France, might in some degree have supplied the want of English troops. Not only did the British Government decline facilitating the loan which the Imperial Court had intended to negociate at London; but when it at length decided on offering some subsidy to the Continental Powers, it appeared that the sum destined for this purpose, so far from meeting the exigencies of the allies, would not even have covered the indispensable expences of Prussia.

In fine, the use which has been made of the British forces in the Mediterranean, has not been more conformable than the rest to the unity and the connection with which it was indispensable to act in the operations of Russia and England. In lieu of attempting an expedition on the continent of Italy, with a view of reconquering the kingdom of Naples, or else in lieu of uniting these forces to those of Russia, which were designed to compel the Porte to a reasonable Peace, one part of the English troops stationed in Sicily directed their course towards an entirely different destination, which the British Government had not even judged proper to communicate to the Court of Russia. It is a point not to be contested, that, by following one or the other of the courses which I have just cited, the English troops in the Mediterranean would have been of an infinitely greater utility to the common cause, by compelling the enemy to divide his forces, which would have enabled Russia to have sent to her main army those reinforcements, which she was under the necessity of employing on the Danube, to support her army destined to make head against the Turkish forces, which might be collected in that quarter.

From this statement, I am willing to believe that

your Excellency will be persuaded, that in such a conjuncture, it only remained for the Emperor my Master to look to the glory and to the security of his empire; and that if the present crisis does not produce every result which might be expected, if the Powers equally interested had displayed vigour in the same proportion as they have exhibited tardiness and irresolution in all their operations, no blame can on this account be attached to Russia.

But, at the same time, the Emperor my Master offers his mediation to His Britannic Majesty, to make his peace with France, having the certainty that it will be accepted by the latter Power. I have the honour to be,

With high consideration, Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) A. DE BUDBERG.

Tilsit, 18th (30th) June, 1807.

Note from M. Alopeus to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated London, 20th July, (1st August,) 1807.

(Translation.)

The Undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, to His Britannic Majesty, has received the orders of his Court to notify to the British Ministry, that a Treaty of Peace was concluded at Tilsit on the 25th June, (7th July,) between Russia and France.

His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, having, on this occasion, proposed his mediation, for the purpose of negociating and concluding likewise a Treaty of Peace between England and France, and the Emperor Napoleon having, by the 18th Article of the aforementioned Treaty of Peace, accepted that mediation, the object of the present note is to offer it in like manner to His Majesty the King of Great Britain.

Long since acquainted with the pacific sentiments of His Britannic Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias flatters himself the more, that he will embrace

this opportunity, of restoring peace to all nations, and of insuring repose to the present generation: since that, in many conversations which His Imperial Majesty has held with the Emperor of the French, he has had reason to be convinced, that he is sincerely desirous of the re-establishment of a maritime peace, upon equitable and honourable principles.

The Emperor of all the Russias not only offers his interposition for the attainment of so desirable a result; but he would even be ready to promise the support of all the forces of his Empire, for insuring the performance of all the stipulations of peace, when once it shall have taken place between England and France. By this guarantee, His Britannic Majesty will obtain that which he has ever appeared to desire, and may, without distrust follow the bent of his humane and pacific sentiments.

The Undersigned, in requesting Mr. Canning, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to apprize him as soon as possible of the determination which the Cabinet of St. James's may judge expedient to take in consequence of this offer of mediation on the part of His August Master, avails himself of the opportunity of renewing to his Excellency the assurances of his highest consideration.

(Signed.) M. ALOPEUS.

London, 20th July, (1st August,) 1807.

Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to M. Alopeus, dated 5th August, 1807.

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had lost no time in laying before the King his Master the official Note presented to him by M. Alopeus, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; in which M. Alopeus, by order of his Court, notifies to the British Government the conclusion, at Tilsit, on the 25th June, (7th July,) of a Treaty of Peace between Russia and France; and announces, at the same time, the offer of the mediation of His Imperial

Majesty, for the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France, and the acceptance of that offer by the French Government.

The Undersigned has it in command from the King his Master to declare, that the Emperor of Russia does justice to the sentiments of the King, when His Imperial Majesty expresses his reliance on the King's disposition to contribute to the restoration of a general peace, such as may insure the repose of Europe. Ample proofs of that disposition have recently been afforded by His Majesty, as well in the answer returned, in His Majesty's name, to the offer of the mediation of the Emperor of Austria, as in the willingness expressed by His Majesty to accede to the Convention concluded at Bartenstein, on the 23d of April, between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, and in the instructions which the Undersigned transmitted, by His Majesty's command, upon the first intelligence of the late disastrous events in Poland, to His Majesty's Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburgh, by which instructions that ambassador was directed to signify to the Ministers of the Emperor of Russia His Majesty's perfect readiness to enter, in concert with his August Ally, into any negociation which the Emperor of Russia might think it expedient to open for the restoration of a general peace.

These sentiments and this disposition His Majesty continues invariably to maintain.

The Undersigned is, therefore, commanded by His Majesty, to assure M. Alopeus, that His Majesty waits, with the utmost solicitude, for the communication of the Articles of the Treaty concluded at Tilsit, and for the statement of those equitable and honourable principles upon which His Imperial Majesty expresses his belief that France is desirous of concluding a peace with Great Britain.

His Majesty trusts that the character of the stipulations of the Treaty of Tilsit, and of the principles upon which France is represented as being ready to negociate, may be found to be such as to afford to His Majesty a just hope of the attainment of a secure and honourable peace.

In that case His Majesty will readily avail himself of the offer of the Emperor of Russia's mediation.

But until His Majesty shall have received these important and necessary communications, it is obviously impossible, that the Undersigned should be authorised to return a more specific answer to the note presented by M. Alopeus.

The Undersigned requests M. Alopeus to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

Dispatch from the Right Honourable Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, Sept. 2d, 1807.—Received September 19th.

St. Petersburgh, Sept. 2d, 1807.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you, that on Saturday evening, 29th August, I received, by Sir Stephen Shairp, who left the fleet off Copenhagen upon the 24th of August, your dispatches No. 32 and 33, and on Sunday the Messenger, Ruff, delivered to me those from No. 26 to 31 inclusive.

Being thus completely put in possession of the sentiments of His Majesty's Government upon all the points which could come into discussion between this country and Great Britain, I lost no time in requesting a conference with General Budberg, who, though extremely unwell, invited me to call upon him last night.

I began the conference by observing, that his Excellency being already apprized by the answer given by his Majesty's Secretary of State, to M. Alopeus, of the conditional acceptance by the Court of London, of the proffered mediation of Russia, I had to state to him, that I was instructed in the first instance to request the communication of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit, and a frank disclosure of the general views and intentions of the court of St. Petersburgh. That im-

partiality was the first requisite in the character of a mediator, and that before the British Government agreed to avail itself of the mediation of this Court, it was essentially necessary that England should be placed, with regard to the mediating power, on an equal footing with France; that the confidential intercourse which had taken place between the Emperor and Bonaparte at Tilsit, and by which His Imperial Majesty became acquainted with the principles upon which the French Government proposed negociating with the Court of London, had naturally excited an uneasiness in England, which could only be removed by an unreserved communication; that I could not conceal from him, that the period peremptorily prescribed to His Majesty for the acceptance of the Russian mediation, had created in London a very unfavourable impression against the intervention of His Imperial Majesty; that, however, notwithstanding His Majesty had just reason to be offended with the terms of the 13th article, such was his desire to embrace any opening which afforded the prospect of the conclusion of an honourable peace, that he would not retract the conditional acceptance of the mediation, which had already been conveyed to the Russian Government, in the Note addressed by you to M. Alopeus; that His Majesty, at the same time, looked for some mark of the good-will of the Emperor of Russia towards Great Britain; that M. Alopeus had, before the late unfortunate events of Friedland and Tilsit, requested of you a *Projêt* of a new Treaty of Commerce, and had given the assurance of the disposition of his Court to proceed to the definitive conclusion of a commercial arrangement between the two countries; that a *Projêt* had, in compliance with his wish, been communicated and transmitted to St. Petersburgh; and that if the good will of His Imperial Majesty towards England continued unaltered, I trusted no delay would take place in proceeding to the negociation of this Treaty; that the existence of any stipulation in this *Projêt*, which was not approved of by this Government, was no obstacle to our entering into negociation upon it, because I should take upon myself to agree to any modifications which did not ap-

pear to change the basis and principles upon which it had been framed; that as France had, by the 27th article of the Tilsit Treaty, secured the re-establishment of her former commercial relations with Russia, a natural and obvious mode of proving the impartiality of the Emperor would be the renewal of the Commercial Treaty with Great Britain.

General Budberg began his reply by acknowledging the existence of Secret Articles belonging to the Treaty of Tilsit. There were some, he said, which in no way concerned the interests of England; that he could assure me, and, as an honest man, he would not say it if it were not truth, there existed no secret article whatever, which stipulated the shutting the Russian ports against the British commerce; that with respect to the *Projêt* of the Treaty of Commerce, he had to confess that, from the press of other business, and the bad state of his health, he had not had time to lay it before the Emperor; that it must necessarily be considered by the Minister of Commerce, before he could confer with me upon it; and that as to the 27th Article of the Tilsit Treaty, it only placed the commercial relations of the two countries upon the same footing that they had been before the commencement of hostilities; that the Commercial Treaty with France was not renewed, and would expire in two years; and that it by no means followed, because Bonaparte had communicated to the Emperor of Russia the basis upon which he was ready to conclude peace with England, that His Imperial Majesty had made any communications at Tilsit of the future views and system of the Court of Petersburgh.

The General appeared to wish that I should consider this answer as sufficiently satisfactory to authorize me to accept the mediation of his Court. I observed, in reply, that it was difficult to conceive any articles of a peace between Russia and France which did not directly or indirectly concern Great Britain; but that I asked the communication of the secret articles, not only as an object which might affect the interests of England, but as a mark of the continuance of that friendship and confidence on the part of this Court, which could alone

afford any prospect of good from the acceptance of the mediation of the Emperor of Russia; that, with the same view, I had proposed continuing the Negociations begun by Mons. Alopeus; and that if his Excellency had no authority at present to say any thing more satisfactory than what I had as yet heard from him, I must request him to ask the permission of the Emperor to communicate to me, without reserve, the secret Articles of the Treaty between Russia and France, and to empower him to continue the Negociations, and conclude a Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain.

General Budberg promised me, that he would lose no time in bringing these two requests under the consideration of His Imperial Majesty.

I have the honour to be,
With the greatest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Right Honourable Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, September 2d, 1807. —*Received September 19th.*

I had the satisfaction of finding last night that a considerable change had taken place in the tone and temper of General Budberg's conversation. Instead of that coldness and reserve which characterised the replies of the Russian Minister to the questions which I had thought it my duty to put to him in previous conferences, I found a very mild and conciliating manner, and an apparent anxiety to remove every difficulty in the way of a perfectly good understanding between the two countries. I regretted the reserve which had marked the conduct of the Russian Government towards England. He answered that Russia had just grounds of complaint against England: he went into a long detail of the little attention that had been given to the repeated repre-

sentations of the Emperor of Russia, and I could not be surprised, he said, that in the first moment of misfortune, arising from the want of co-operation, he should testify some degree of discontent. I replied that we could not better serve the cause of Bonaparte than by indulging in mutual recrimination on the past conduct of each government; that I wished our whole attention, should be turned to the future, and that I was persuaded if the Emperor of Russia still entertained his former opinions of the danger to be apprehended from the preponderance of France, the cause of the independence of Europe was by no means desperate.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Right Honourable Lord Granville Leveson Gower to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, 2d September, 1807.—Received September 19th.

As General Budberg carefully avoided every allusion to the late transactions at Copenhagen during the interview which took place between us on Tuesday, I was somewhat surprised on the following morning to receive the Note of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. In my answer, also inclosed, I have endeavoured to follow closely those among the reasons stated in your dispatches, which I conceive likely to prove the least offensive to this government, reserving other arguments for my first future conference with the Minister.

(First inclosure referred to in the foregoing.)

(Translation)

His Majesty the Emperor has just learned, with the utmost surprise, by accounts from His Minister at Copenhagen, as well as by a dispatch from His Danish Majesty's Minister at this Court, that Mr. Jackson, His Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiary, has made propositions as derogatory to, as incompatible with the dignity of every independent power, and that, upon the refusal of the prince Royal of Denmark to accede to a

pretension so extraordinary, the English fleet has taken a position which evidently announces intentions hostile towards Denmark.

The ties of consanguinity and friendship which unite His Imperial Majesty with the King of Denmark, not suffering him to view with indifference any danger which might menace the dominions or the independence of that sovereign, the Undersigned has received commands to invite his Excellency Lord Granville Leveson Gower to acquaint him with the motives which have induced the Cabinet of St. James's to adopt proceedings so extraordinary against Denmark. The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) A. DE BUDBERG.

St. Petersburgh,
20th August, (1st Sept.) 1807.

(Second Inclosure.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburgh, 21st Aug. (2d Sept.) 1807.

Agreeably to the desire of his Excellency General Budberg, the Undersigned, Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty, loses no time in communicating to the Russian Government the motives which led to the steps taken by the King's Minister at the Court of Denmark, and to the subsequent operations of the British forces against the Island of Zealand.

The British Ministry had been a long time in possession of positive *data* which left no doubt as to the intention of the French Government respecting the maritime means of Denmark; and the projects against England from that quarter, which were matured by the Continental Peace, certainly cannot have escaped the penetration of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. The Danish fleet destined to cover a descent on the British coasts being therefore an object essential for the accomplishment of the views of France, the King found himself under the necessity of securing himself from so imminent a danger, by those precautions which were adopted with regret, however indispensable for the security

of his empire. The ties of relationship which unite the two Courts of London and of Copenhagen, would have inspired the King with the desire of avoiding such a painful extremity, and of respecting, as far as depended upon himself, the interests of Denmark; but his duty called equally for measures adapted to ward off a danger which threatened not only the welfare of his people, but the existence of his Crown.

The Undersigned, having thus frankly replied to General Budberg's note, will with pleasure furnish a more detailed verbal explanation, should his Excellency desire it; and he avails himself of the opportunity to repeat the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) G. L. GOWER.

His Excellency General de Budberg, &c.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning, to the Right Hon. Lord Granville Leveson Gower, dated September 27th, 1807.

Foreign Office, September 27th, 1807.

Sir Robert Wilson arrived here on Saturday the 19th with your Excellency's Dispatches of the 2d instant, which I have laid before the King.

Whatever may have been the motives or the causes of the change which your Excellency represents to have taken place in the tone of the Russian Councils, or whatever may be the probability of the continuance of the system now apparently adopted: His Majesty hails with the most sincere satisfaction the return of those sentiments of friendship and confidence on the part of his august Ally, from which His Majesty on his part has never deviated, and the cultivation of which is more than ever necessary for their common interests.

Your Excellency will lose no opportunity of expressing these sentiments to His Imperial Majesty and His Minister.

The forbearance and moderation which your Excellency has been all along instructed to employ in all your

remonstrances with respect to transactions in which the personal character of His Imperial Majesty was so immediately concerned, and the reliance which you have not failed to express on the returning sense of what was due to His Majesty's long experienced friendship and fidelity, accord perfectly with the language which you are now instructed to use, and make the whole of His Majesty's conduct towards his Imperial Majesty uniform and consistent. And your Excellency cannot too constantly impress upon the Russian Minister, the topick which you have so judiciously employed in your late conferences, that in the present state of the world, retrospect and recrimination are worse than useless; and that the establishment of future good understanding and the concert of measures to be taken with a view to future exertion, are alone the proper subjects of discussion between the two Governments.

Your Excellency did perfectly right in declining to consider the communication of General Budberg as sufficiently satisfactory to authorize your acceptance, on the part of His Majesty, of the mediation of the Emperor of Russia.

The points upon which the question of this acceptance turns, are,

1st, The frank communication of the Articles of the Treaty of Tilsit, secret as well as avowed.

2dly, A distinct explanation of the basis upon which France proposes to treat, and which appeared to His Imperial Majesty at Tilsit so just and honourable.

These are the conditions directly stipulated in my Note to M. Alopeus, and without which an acceptance of any meditation by His Majesty could be nothing else than a complete surrender of his honour and his interest into the hands of the mediator, if not of the enemy.

But to these are reasonably to be added, if not as conditions without which it would be impossible to consent to treat under the auspices of Russia, at least as those which His Majesty has a right to require from a friendly Power, before he commits himself to its guidance in a question affecting the immediate safety and the future welfare of his dominions;

1st, A discleurse of the general views of policy of the Emperor of Russia; and of any engagements into which he may have entered with respect to the different powers in whose fortunes His Majesty takes an interest; and

2dly, Some plain and decisive proof of the good understanding subsisting between His Majesty and his august Ally; such as shall satisfy, not His Majesty only, but Europe and the world, of the impartiality with which His Imperial Majesty has undertaken, and proposes to administer, the duties of his office as Mediator.

With respect to the first of the two points which I have stated as absolutely indispensable, General Budberg appears as yet to have gone no farther than to give a verbal assurance that there is not any article, among the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, stipulating for the shutting of the Russian ports against Great Britain.

But it will immediately have occurred to your Excellency, that a distinction might probably be taken in M. de Budberg's mind between a stipulation for the immediate and unconditional execution of a purpose, and the agreement to resort to it eventually, under circumstances which may not yet have occurred; and that supposing the former only to be the sense of M. de Budberg's assurance, that assurance might be literally true, without in fact conveying any thing essentially satisfactory.

The inference to be drawn from this circumstance is, that the Russian Minister should be called upon by your Excellency in an official note, not for a simple disavowal only of any single article, but for the communication of the secret articles themselves, or at least of any agreement, actual or eventual, in which the interests of this country or its Allies are in any degree concerned.

In the same formal manner a communication should be required of the basis of peace proposed by France; upon which the Russian Minister does not appear to have offered any explanation.

The other two points are not so strictly connected

with the question of mediation. But it is nevertheless perfectly reasonable that His Majesty should require some ostensible proof of the goodwill of his august Ally, to counteract the general impression which must have been created by late events, of a difference and disunion between them; before His Majesty can with a good grace accept those offices at the Emperor of Russia's hands, of which impartiality should be the essential character. No proof could be selected, at once so easy for His Imperial Majesty to give, so grateful to His Majesty to receive, so natural in the eyes of the world, and so little liable to exception on the part of France, as the renewal of the Treaty of Commerce.

With respect to the remaining point, which your Excellency is instructed to urge—a communication on the part of the Russian Government of its general views and policy for the future—you will observe, that His Imperial Majesty himself annexed to his conditional acceptance of the mediation of the Emperor of Austria, a similar demand of the communication of the general views of the Court of Vienna, respecting the future state of Europe.

In the Treaty of Bartenstein, concluded between His Imperial Majesty and the King of Prussia, and offered by them to the acceptance of other powers as the basis of a co-operation for the purpose of producing a general pacific arrangement, a distinct and detailed exposition was entered into with respect not only to the powers intended to be comprehended as parties to the Treaty, but to all the other powers of Europe in whose fate any one of the principal powers could be supposed to be interested.

These examples of what his Imperial Majesty has done, and what he has required, would sufficiently authorize His Majesty's solicitude to obtain a similar explanation on the present occasion.

But there are other grounds for it in the very state and circumstances of Europe, as arising out of the Treaty of Tilsit, and the stipulations annexed to it; some of which stipulations are already carrying into

execution in a way to excite His Majesty's apprehensions, if not for his own interests, for those of his Allies.

Is it possible that His Majesty should not think it essential to be informed whether the public article of the Treaty of Tilsit, which recognizes the French King of Naples *only* as King of Naples, is, in effect, contradicted by a secret article, which adds to this title that of the Two Sicilies?

The movements in the Mediterranean, and the surrender of Corfu, naturally give rise to a variety of apprehensions, which it would be for the interest of both countries to quiet, or at least to reduce within the bounds of truth.

Has not his Majesty the right to require some explanation of the intentions of Russia with respect to Turkey; a Power with whom His Majesty finds himself at war, and left alone in the war, for no other than Russian interests, and from a quarrel espoused by His Majesty for the sake of his Ally?

These topics your Excellency will urge in your conferences with M. De Budberg with all the earnestness, which their importance requires, but, at the same time, carefully avoiding a strain of reproach; and even when you are obliged to confess the suspicion of engagements having been entered into such as his Majesty cannot but disapprove, conducting your inquiry in such a manner as shall lead M. de Budberg to believe that His Majesty is anxious rather to find the means of preventing or remedying the evil, than to discover the grounds of complaint against Russia.

Upon the whole, your Excellency will collect from these instructions, that His Majesty is as much desirous as ever to cultivate the friendship and alliance of the Emperor of Russia; that he conceives the only chance of safety for what remains of Europe to depend upon the renewal of a good understanding between them; that His Majesty has never, even under appearances the most unfavourable, altogether despaired of such a recurrence, on the part of the Emperor, to the counsels which are best calculated for his own glory, and for

the security of his own dominions, as it is now hoped has taken place; and that his Majesty, upon such a change, is eager to forget all that has passed of a nature contradictory to those counsels, or inconsistent with them.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning to the Right Honourable Lord Granville Leveson Gower, dated September 28th, 1807.

Foreign-Office, September 28th, 1807.

His Majesty entirely approves of the answer returned by your Excellency to General Budberg's note on the subject of the operations at Copenhagen.

I inclose to your Excellency a copy of the Declaration which His Majesty has caused to be published on that subject, in which your Excellency will find the principles upon which His Majesty has acted clearly laid down; and in which the disposition of His Majesty to limit the measures of hostility to which he has unfortunately found himself compelled to have recourse, is announced with that frankness and moderation which characterize His Majesty's conduct.

In conversing upon this subject with the Russian Minister, your Excellency, in addition to the arguments so correctly stated in your note, and to those with which His Majesty's Declaration will furnish you, will not hesitate to appeal to the Russian Government itself for reasons in justification of the measures to which his Majesty has been under the necessity of resorting.

You will remind General Budberg, not as matter of reproach, but as matter of fact merely, that from the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit down to the hour at which your Excellency's dispatches by Sir Robert Wilson were received here, the British Government were without one word of assurance as to the amicable intentions of Russia towards Great Britain. The offer of mediation, under all the circumstances which belonged to it, was calculated to excite any other feeling rather than that of confidence in the Emperor's good-will; and every account that was received here of the temper in

which that proposal was made, and of the light in which it was viewed by the enemy, justified the belief that it was intended by Russia rather as preparatory to hostility consequent upon His Majesty's refusal, than as likely to lead to a pacific result through his acceptance.

In the mean time, the publication of the Prussian peace and the concealment of the Russian; and the intelligence of the plan brought forward in the conferences of Tilsit for a general confederacy against this country, in which the natives of Denmark and Portugal were destined to co-operate (intelligence since confirmed by a frank and friendly communication from Portugal herself of such a proposal having been actually made to her by France, and enforced with threats of instant and destructive hostility in case of her declining to comply with it) these circumstances, coupled with the actual preparations for the reception of a large French force at Hamburgh, formed together such a body of evidence, not only of the designs of Bonaparte, but of the connivance, if not of the participation, of Russia, that His Majesty would have been wanting alike in what he owed to his own dignity and to the security of his dominions, if he had not taken the most effectual steps for breaking through the combination that was collecting round him; and it would have been idle, under such circumstances, to have waited the consent of Russia to measures calculated to repel a danger, of which Russia herself formed so large a part.

It cannot be disguised, therefore, that the want of communication on the part of the Russian Government has been in no small degree the cause of the very mischief which that Government now laments.

Confident as His Majesty is in the justification of the vigorous and decisive steps to which the necessity of self-preservation obliged him to resort, he would yet more willingly have been spared the painful task of acting upon that necessity, had Russia been in a state to offer her guarantee of the neutrality of Denmark, instead of affording such strong ground of suspicion that she was prepared to countenance, if not to instigate, her hostility.

But it is useless, as well as painful, to dwell upon what might have been the course of events, if the Emperor of Russia had not unwarily delivered himself over to the counsels of France, at a moment when it was of all others the most essential that a good understanding should be kept up between Russia and Great Britain.

Your Excellency will therefore dwell on these topics no longer than may be necessary to impress upon the mind of the Russian Minister, the conviction that the supposed unfriendliness of Russia must of itself have prevented His Majesty from communicating with His Imperial Majesty on the subject of Denmark, before he proceeded to those strong but necessary measures, the result of which has dispelled all apprehensions of danger from that quarter.

It remains now according to the principle wisely established in your Excellency's late conferences with General Budberg, to look forward to the probable consequences of what has taken place, and to endeavour to turn them to such account as may be most beneficial both to Russia and Great Britain, and to that cause which their re-union might yet afford a hope of conducting to a favourable issue.

After the perusal of the Papers which I inclose, your Excellency will be fully informed of the whole situation of affairs with respect to Denmark.

His Majesty is perfectly willing that the pacification with the Court of Denmark should be wholly the work of the Emperor of Russia; that it should originate in His Imperial Majesty's Counsels, be conducted under his auspices, and concluded under his guarantee.

The situation of His Imperial Majesty, as the natural Protector of the north, obviously points him out for such a task; which even France could not refuse to assign to him, unless France were ripe for breaking with the Court of Petersburgh.

Denmark has unquestionably applied to the Emperor of Russia for protection. How can that application be better answered than by the Emperor of Russia engaging to bring Great Britain to an arrangement upon such terms as are stated in the inclosed Papers? And to such

engagement on the part of the Emperor of Russia, the Emperor is before-hand assured of the consent of His Majesty.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Right Hon. Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to Mr Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, September 9, 1807. Received October 7th.

I have the honour to inform you, that on Tuesday last General Budberg gave up the *Portfeuille* of the Foreign Affairs to Count Soltykoff.

I took an early opportunity after this notification of seeing Count Soltykoff, and recapitulated to him what had passed in my last conference with General Budberg; I reminded him of the promise made by his predecessor, to bring under the immediate consideration of the Emperor, the points upon which I had been instructed to obtain an answer from this Court, before I could signify the acceptance of His Majesty to the proposed offer of mediation. I observed that the tardiness of this Government upon this subject ill accorded with the anxiety expressed by his Imperial Majesty for the conclusion of peace between England and France. Count Soltykoff answered, that he would on the following day take the Emperor's orders with respect to the communication of the secret Articles of the Treaty of Tilsit; that without seeing His Imperial Majesty he could take upon himself to say that the Russian Government was well-disposed to enter into a negotiation upon the Treaty of Commerce; and he repeated what I had before heard from General Budberg, that the *Projêt de Traité* transmitted by M. Alopeus must in the first instance be submitted to the consideration of the department which it peculiarly concerned. In the course of our conversation he gave many general assurances of the amicable disposition of this Court towards England, and of the satisfaction he should feel in contributing to the establishment of a footing of friendly and confidential intercourse between our two Governments.

Count Soltykoff being in the country yesterday, my

endeavours to see him were unavailing; but I this morning obtained a conference, when, after some expressions of regret at his first communication with me being of an unpleasant nature, he told me, that he was authorized by the Emperor to inform me, that His Imperial Majesty did not think proper to communicate the secret articles. It is not, he said, on account of their containing any stipulations prejudicial to England; but having once determined that these Articles should not be made public, the Emperor sees no reason for receding from his determination.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Right Hon. Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, September 9, 1807.—*Received Oct.* 7.

St. Petersburgh, Sept. 9, 1807.

My last dispatches to you had scarcely left Petersburgh, when I received information that the Emperor had named Count Romanzow, Minister for Foreign Affairs. This appointment was officially made known three days afterwards to the corps diplomatique by a circular note.

I thought it my duty to lose no time in seeing Count Romanzow; and the state of suspense in which I have been so long kept with respect to the Negotiation of the Renewal of the Treaty of Commerce, justified me in requesting an immediate conference with the new Minister.

After the usual compliments upon his appointment, I expressed to him the regret I felt at the extraordinary reserve of his Court towards that of London, and my extreme disappointment at the refusal which had been signified to me by Count Soltykoff to communicate to me the secret arrangements concluded at Tilsit. I observed that this refusal made it impossible for the King my Master to avail himself of His Imperial Majesty's offer of mediation; for how, I said, could it be expected that His Majesty would accept the mediation of a Sovereign, between whom and Bonaparte there was every appearance of intimate union and secret under-

standing, and from whom His Majesty had not been able to obtain any mark whatever of friendship and confidence? I added, that I was the more surprised at this conduct, because, notwithstanding the grounds of dissatisfaction which the published Articles of the Treaty of Tilsit afforded to His Majesty, such was his partiality towards his august Ally, that he had been disposed to look upon them as forced upon His Imperial Majesty by the unfortunate circumstances of the moment; and I had, even since the knowledge of these public Articles, been authorised to give fresh assurances of the desire of His Majesty to renew the intimacy and confidence which had before subsisted between the two courts.

Count Romanzow answered, that the Emperor's friendship for His Majesty had been proved by his anxiety that Peace should be concluded between England and France, and that his impartiality had been manifested by his offer of mediation; impartiality being the necessary attribute of a mediator.

After giving the obvious answer to his novel mode of reasoning, I expressed my hope that the union of the two departments of commerce and foreign affairs in the same person would accelerate the negotiation of the treaty of commerce. Nearly a month had elapsed since the arrival here of a *Projêt* of a treaty transmitted by M. Alopeus, and as yet I have not been able to obtain an answer whether the stipulations of that *Projêt* of a treaty were approved of here, or even whether the Russian Government were disposed to enter at all into negotiations upon this subject. Count Romanzow assured me that he never heard of this *Projêt* but from Sir Stephen Shairp; that since he had received the *Portefeuille* of the Foreign Affairs, he had inquired for it, but it could not be found, and that he supposed it must be among the Papers of the Emperor. I proposed to send him a copy; which he declined to accept, saying, that he would, in the first instance, acquaint the Emperor that I had requested an answer from this government upon the question of the renewal of the treaty of commerce.

I took this opportunity of observing to him that M.

Alopeus had asked for this *Projêt*; and that, therefore, unless a perfect change had taken place in the friendly dispositions of this Court, the Emperor would certainly approve of our entering into negotiation upon it, though it might happen that some of the provisions of it might possibly be considered here as not wholly free from objection.

He said, that he was happy to hear from Sir Stephen Shairp that the *Projêt* contained nothing contrary to the regulations prescribed in the Manifesto of the 1st of January, for that was a fundamental law of the country; and after boasting of the indulgence he had shown to the English merchants in the execution of this Act, he shewed a wish to end our conference, by beginning a conversation on different subjects.

Dispatch from the Right Honorable Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, 19th September, (1st Oct.) 1807. *—Received October 28th.*

St. Petersburgh, 1st October, 1807.

Sir—I had the honour, by the last Messenger, to inform you of my having communicated to Count Romanzow a copy of the capitulation of Copenhagen, accompanied by a short Note, in which I expressed my hope that this capitulation might be followed by the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and Denmark.

Six days after I received the inclosed Note from the Russian Minister. The pretensions set forth in this paper, and the tone in which they are urged, appeared to me to be of a nature to call for an immediate answer. In my reply (of which I inclose a copy) I endeavoured to satisfy the Russian Minister that His Majesty's Government had, in the communications which I had been authorized to make, shewn every reasonable mark of respect and consideration for His Imperial Majesty, notwithstanding his change of system and principles; but I thought it no less necessary to let the Russian Minister clearly understand, that His Majesty was not to be frightened out of the pursuit of such measures as he

might judge expedient for the security of his empire, by any indirect menace or intimation of the displeasure of the Emperor of Russia.

At the same time that I sent this answer, I requested a conference with Count Romanzow, with a view of extracting from him some explanation of the expression, *que l'Empereur se doit a lui meme comme aux interets de son Empire de ne pas s'y montrer insensible.* Two days and a half passed without any notice being taken of this request of a conference. I renewed my demand; when on the following day Count Romanzow wrote, that he intended passing two days at Gatschina, the palace of the Empress mother, but that on his return on Wednesday he would receive me.

I accordingly called upon him this day. Upon my entrance he made many apologies for not having appointed an earlier day for our conference. I told him that my impatience proceeded from my wish to avoid all possible misunderstanding between our two Courts; that I was sorry to observe, that in the Note which he addressed to me, he had made use of certain expressions which would with great reason create considerable uneasiness in England; that he must be sufficiently well acquainted with the British Government to know, that whatever might be the wishes and views of this Court, no more effectual mode could have been adopted to prevent their receiving that attention which had uniformily been given to the representations of this country, than the use of language which implied menace. I acknowledged that the very current reports of an embargo being about to be laid upon English ships in Russian ports, which reports, I was sorry to observe had originated with a person employed in the office for foreign affairs, had perhaps the effect of making me attribute a more hostile sense to some parts of the Note, than what was really intended by his Excellency; but that the knowledge of these reports would certainly reach England, and that it was now, therefore, in the highest degree essential that I should receive from him assurances that the Emperor entertained no hostile intention towards Great Britain.

Count Romanzow answered, that I must be aware how little worthy of credit were the frequent reports that had been raised at St Petersburgh, of an embargo being to be laid upon English ships; and that he could assure me that the Russian Government had not even thought of such a measure. But upon my construing his words into an assurance that no embargo would take place, and expressing the satisfaction I should feel in transmitting such an assurance to my Court, he replied, that he was not authorized to say any thing to me of the future intentions of his Sovereign; that neither he nor the Danish Minister had received any accounts from Kiel since the capture of Copenhagen; that the Emperor, therefore, being as yet unacquainted with the sentiments or views of the Prince Royal of Denmark, since that event, naturally waited for the communication of them, before His Imperial Majesty could make up his own opinion upon the question.

Count Romanzow then asked me, whether it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to restore the ships to the King of Denmark in the case of peace being concluded with France? I observed, that hostilities having commenced, the possession of the Danish fleet had been obtained by force, and not by negociation; and that he would see by the terms of the capitulation, that no such condition had been agreed to by the Commanders of His Majesty's Forces; but that I had received no dispatches, whatever from you since the news of the capture of Copenhagen had reached London. I have the honour to be,

With the greatest respect, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.

To the Right Hon. George Canning,
&c. &c. &c.

(First inclosure referred to in the foregoing.)
(Translation.)

The undersigned has had the honour to lay before the Emperor, the note and the copy of the capitulation of Copenhagen, transmitted to him by his Excellency Lord G. L. Gower.

His Imperial Majesty has viewed with infinite concern all the misfortunes which have overwhelmed a Monarch, to whom he is attached by the ties of blood, and those of a long friendship.

When the British Ministry conceived the design of despoiling Denmark of her fleet; when they dispatched for that purpose to the Baltic, a numerous land force and a considerable fleet, they gave no intimation of it to His Imperial Majesty. This silence, this extreme reserve, may serve as a proof, that the Cabinet of St. James's were themselves persuaded that what they were undertaking was directly contrary to the interests of Russia.

So in fact it is, and the Emperor owes it to himself, and to the interests of his Empire, not to shew himself insensible to it.

His Majesty considers himself as guarantee of the security and of the tranquillity of the Baltic sea: at what period have the tranquillity and the security of that sea been so molested as in this instance?

The Undersigned having apprized His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador of the sentiments of the Emperor his Master, avails himself of this opportunity, &c.

(Signed) Count NICOLAS DE ROMANZOW.

St. Petersbugh, 11 (23) *September*, 1807.

(Second inclosure.)

(Translation.)

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of yesterday's date, which the Count de Romanzow addressed to him. He will lose no time in transmitting it to his Court, but the charges which it contains against the British Government, impose on the Undersigned the duty of requesting his Excellency to submit without delay to His Imperial Majesty some observations which may place in their true light the reciprocal proceedings of both powers.

Although the celerity indispensible to the execution of the measures of precaution adopted with regard to Den-

mark did not allow of any anterior communications, the note of the Undersigned, dated the 2d September, so far from concealing the reasons which produced that expedition, declared them with frankness, and the explanation of them was repeated and accompanied with details in the highest degree satisfactory, at the first conference of the Undersigned with the Ministry of that day.

The secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit are moreover still unknown to the Court of London; and the Undersigned has vainly required a communication of those arrangements, the execution of which daily developes objects in no way conformable to the spirit of the ancient alliances, and absolutely prejudicial to those interests, the maintenance of which formerly constituted an essential part of the Russian system. Is it then for Russia to complain of secrecy, whilst that Court absolutely refuses the only explanation which could have been satisfactory to the Court of London, as to the intentions and the projects meditated with regard to her? This silence, this extreme reserve, may serve as proof that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh were themselves persuaded that their secret arrangements were directly contrary to the interests of Great Britain.

As to the tranquillity of the Baltic, England has never recognised any exclusive rights; and whatever may have been the pretensions of Russia to the title of guarantee of the security of that sea, her silence at the period when every port from Lubeck to Memel was shut against the British flag, appears an open abandonment of those pretensions.

(Signed) GRANVILLE LEVESON GOWER.

12th (24th) September, 1807.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to Mr Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, Oct. 29, 1807.

Sir Robert Wilson arrived here on Saturday, the 17th, and delivered to me your dispatches.

The Emperor having returned from the inspection of his army in Poland only on Thursday last, and Count

Romanzow having for some days previous to that time been waiting at Gatschina the arrival of His Imperial Majesty, it was not till Saturday night that I succeeded in obtaining a conference with the Russian Minister.

My reports of the change of Ministry here, and of the unfriendly tone which has marked the communication I have received from this Government since that change, will have dissipated the hopes which the account of my last conversation with General Budberg, and other representations, had led his Majesty's Government to entertain of the future conduct of this Court.

I began my conference with Count Romanzow, by saying, that I had received instructions which were written under an impression that there existed in this Cabinet a disposition to renew its former footing of confidence with the English Government; I explained to him fairly what had caused this impression; and added, that though His Majesty could regard the energy and resources of his own people as the only sure foundation of the safety and prosperity of his kingdom, yet that he was always inclined to avail himself of any opening which this Court might afford, for re-establishing that union and confidence which appeared advantageous to the mutual interests of both countries, and almost essential for the recovery of the independence of Europe; that the communications I had received from his Excellency, and the conduct of this Government since the *Portefeuille* of Foreign Affairs had been committed to his hands, had so changed the state of things, that I almost doubted whether I should be justified in executing the instructions I had received; but that trusting that he would do justice to the persevering moderation of His Majesty, I would state to him with frankness what was the nature of these instructions. His Majesty's Declaration, I observed, sufficiently explained to Europe, that the Court of London had no views of aggrandizing or enriching itself at the expense of Denmark. For the security of the British dominions, His Majesty had been forced to remove out of the reach of France the naval means of Denmark; but this object being accomplished, the English Government were ready to forego

any advantage that might be derived to Great Britain from the continuance of this war; and His Majesty was ready to concert with Russia the means of re-establishing the tranquillity of the North of Europe. That object could be obtained only by the restoration of the neutrality of Denmark, and that neutrality could be rendered real and permanent only through the means of Russia. The Court of Petersburgh, I said, was even more interested than the Court of London in the success of this negociation.

Count Romanzow answered, "How can Russia recommend to Denmark to submit to the affront she has received, and to endure with patience all her losses?" I replied, "If by the continuance of the war, Denmark could hope to recover her fleet, she might with reason be indisposed to listen to such advice; but when it was evident to every person who reflected for a moment on the actual state of things, that the Court of Copenhagen, by the continuance of the war, could gain nothing but the entrance of a French army into the body of its territory, I could not but think that a friendly representation from a neutral power, of a danger which threatened the very existence of Denmark, might recal the Prince Royal to a more dispassionate consideration of the real interests of his country."

Count Romanzow repeated to me, that he did not see how the Court of Petersburgh could interfere; but added, that he could give me no positive answer to what I had represented to him, till he had made his report of my communication to His Imperial Majesty.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Right Hon. Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1807.—Received November 28.

St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1807.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of an official Note, which, in consequence of the instructions contained in your dispatch of the 27th September, I immediately addressed to Count Romanzow, upon the question of the proffered mediation of Russia. It is now nearly ten days since I sent it, and have as yet received no answer.

(Inclosure referred to in the last.)

(Translation.)

Notwithstanding his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs has announced His Imperial Majesty's determination not to make any confidential communication of the secret Articles contained in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and France, a determination, which the Russian Minister has been apprized must render fruitless the offer of mediation proposed by the Court of St. Petersburgh; the Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, cannot nevertheless entirely abandon his solicitations, without requesting His Excellency Count Romanzow to furnish him with a statement of the reasons which may have produced this reserve.

His Excellency will see, moreover, that discussions in which the destinies of so many nations are involved, and which have had for their object the re-establishment of general tranquillity, cannot with propriety be terminated by an avowal purely verbal. The Undersigned therefore hastens to communicate in an official shape to the Imperial Ministry the wishes of his Sovereign, and he cherishes the hope that the Russian Government, agreeable to the desire uniformly testified by the British Ministry, to preserve the ancient relations of confidence between the Courts of London and St. Petersburgh, will no longer hesitate to furnish him with the communication he requires, accompanied by the specification of the principles of honour and equity which His Imperial Majesty had reason to be convinced the French Government was desirous of establishing as the basis of a negociation of peace between England and France.

(Signed) G. L. GOWER.

October 11, (23,) 1807.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Right Honourable Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, Nov. 4, 1807. *Received Dec. 2d.*

St. Petersburgh, Nov. 4, 1807.

On Saturday morning, the 31st ult. no notice having been taken by Count Romanzow, either of my note of

the 23d, or of my verbal overtures respecting Denmark, I requested of his Excellency an early conference. On Monday I wrote a second note to the Russian Minister in which I expressed my regret at being under the necessity of reminding him that I had two days before requested a conference. I yesterday afternoon received an answer, in which he informs me, that he is by order of the Emperor going to Gatschina, and that he cannot, till his return to St. Petersburgh, mention the time when he can receive me. This detail of the difficulties I have experienced in obtaining an interview with Count Romanzow will, I trust, acquit me in the opinion of His Majesty of any dilatoriness in the execution of your instructions. I confess that I am at a loss to find any satisfactory explanation of this wish to avoid communication with me. I have been informed that some members of the council, who have been consulted in the present very critical state of affairs, had advised the Emperor not to reject the present opportunity of re-establishing the tranquillity of the north of Europe: that their opinion has been adopted; and that a note has been written to General Savary, with a view of engaging the French government to consent to the restoration of the neutrality of Denmark. The French General has remonstrated violently against this measure; and the Russian Cabinet, alarmed by the violence of his language, is undecided what answer to return to the overture received from England. But the fear of Bonaparte's displeasure will, without doubt, prevail.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Right Honourable Lord Granville Leveson Gower, to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated St. Petersburgh, 8th Nov. 1807.—*Received Dec. 2d.*

I had the honour of apprizing you by the last messenger, of the difficulty I had experienced in obtaining a conference with Count Romanzow. I yesterday wrote a letter to him, of which the inclosed is a copy, and I this morning received the inclosed note. The contents of this paper are so extremely important, that I will not detain Sir Robert Wilson, by making any observations

upon the unfounded assertions and misrepresentations with which it abounds.

This violent measure has been produced by a peremptory demand (brought by the last Messenger from Paris) of the immediate execution of all the Secret Articles of Tilsit: and the French Mission have boasted, that, after some difficulties, they have gained a complete triumph, and have carried not only this act of hostility against England, but also every other point essential to the success of Bonaparte's views.

I intend asking for passports to-morrow, and shall set out in the course of a few days.

P. S. I inclose a Copy of a printed Declaration, which has been sent by the Russian Government to all the Foreign Ministers residing at this Court.

(First Inclosure, referred to in the last.)

(Translation.)

The Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty has repeatedly signified for more than a week his desire to converse with his excellency the Count Romanzow: his solicitations have been hitherto fruitless, but the Ambassador deems it his duty to renew once more his application, previous to his announcing to his Court the apparent determination of his Excellency to avoid the customary communications.

Oct. 26, *(Nov.* 7,) 1807.

(Second inclosure.)

(Translation.)

The Emperor who, in the course of the war which he has last terminated, had to complain of the conduct of England towards him, suppressed his just resentment, in the consoling hope that the peace he had so lately concluded would lead to a general peace.

He had constituted himself mediator, he had subsequently offered his mediation in acquainting His Britannic Majesty that his desire was to obtain for him an honourable peace; England rejected his offices.

It seemed as if her views were not to suffer the flames

of war to be extinguished, but to kindle them anew in the North, by an event sudden and novel.

The fleets and armies of His Britannic Majesty came to perpetrate against Denmark an act of which history furnishes no example. The Emperor, who, to the knowledge of England, was a guarantee of the tranquillity of the Baltic, which is a close sea; the Emperor, who had been forewarned of nothing, did not conceal his resentment; and, in a second note, delivered to Lord Gower, informed England, that he did not intend to remain a quiet spectator of what had befallen a King, his relation, and his friend.

The Emperor confesses he did not foresee, that, after this Declaration, England would make him the proposal of undertaking to convince Denmark that it was her interest to submit to what had recently befallen her, and to render Russia guarantee that Great Britain should possess, in perfect security, that which she had so lately wrested from Denmark.

The Prince Royal of Denmark had not ratified the Convention of Copenhagen.—As to the second proposals which were made to him, he has again represented to His Imperial Majesty how greatly he was irritated by this new proceeding of the British Ministry towards him.

The Emperor, penetrated with the confidence which the Prince Royal reposed in his friendship, having considered his own wrongs against England, having maturely examined his engagements with the powers of the North, engagements entered into by the Empress Catharine and His Majesty the late Emperor, both of glorious memory, has resolved to fulfil them.

His Majesty has therefore ordered the Undersigned to declare to His Excellency Lord G. L. Gower, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, that His Imperial Majesty breaks off all communication with England, His Imperial Majesty recals the whole of his mission in that country, and will not allow that of His Britannic Majesty to remain at his Court. There shall henceforward be no relations between the two countries.

The Emperor declares that he annuls for ever every Act heretofore concluded between Great Britain and Russia, and especially the convention of the 5th (17th) June 1801. He proclaims anew the principles of the armed neutrality, that monument of the wisdom of the Empress Catharine, and pre-engages never to depart from that system.

He demands from England complete satisfaction for his subjects on all their just claims for ships and merchandise seized or detained against the express tenor of the treaties concluded during his own reign.

The Emperor declares that no arrangements shall take place between Russia and England until the latter shall have given satisfaction to Denmark.

The Emperor expects, that His Britannic Majesty, instead of permitting his Ministers, as has lately been the case, to scatter anew the seeds of war, listening only to the dictates of his own feelings, would lend his assistance to the conclusion of a Peace with His Majesty the Emperor of the French, which would extend the incalculable blessings of peace over the whole world.

When the Emperor shall be satisfied upon all the preceding points, and especially as to the peace between France and England, without which no part of Europe can promise itself real tranquillity, His Imperial Majesty will then readily renew with Great Britain the relations of friendship, which, considering the dissatisfaction which the Emperor so justly feels, he has perhaps already preserved too long.

The Undersigned, having thus fulfilled the orders of the Emperor his Master, requests his Excellency the Ambassador to lay the contents of this Note, without delay, before the King his Sovereign.

(Signed) The Count NICOLAS ROMANZOW.

St. Petersburgh, 27th Oct. (9th Nov.) 1807.

DECLARATION OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

" THE greater value the Emperor attached to the friendship of his Britannic Majesty, the greater was his regret at perceiving that that monarch altogether separated himself from him.

" Twice has the Emperor taken up arms, in which his cause was most directly that of England; and he solicited in vain from England a co-operation which her interest required. He did not demand that her troops should be united with his; he desired only that they should effect a diversion. He was astonished that in her cause she did not act in union with him; but coolly contemplating a bloody spectacle, in a war which had been kindled at her will, she sent troops to attack Buenos Ayres. One part of her armies, which appeared destined to make a diversion in Italy, quitted at length Sicily where it was assembled. There was reason to believe that this was done to make an attack upon the coasts of Naples, when it was understood that it was occupied in attempting to seize and appropriate to itself Egypt.

" But what sensibly touched the heart of his Imperial Majesty was, to perceive that England, contrary to her good faith and the express and precise terms of treaties, troubled at sea the commerce of his subjects. And at what an epoch! when the blood of Russians was shedding in the most glorious warfares, which drew down, and fixed against the armies of his Imperial Majesty, all the military force of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, with whom England was, and is now at war.

" When the two Emperors made peace, his Majesty, in spite of his just resentments against England, did not refrain from rendering her service. His Majesty stipulated, even in the very treaty, that he constituted himself mediator between her and France; and finally offered his mediation to the King of Great Britain. His Majesty announced to the King, that it was with a view

to obtain for him honourable conditions. But the British Ministry, apparently faithful to that plan which was to loosen and break the bonds which had connected Russia and England, rejected the mediation.

"The peace between Russia and France was to prepare a general peace. Then it was that England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself: but it was to cast upon the north of Europe new firebrands, which were to enkindle and nourish the flames of war, which she did not wish to see extinguished. Her fleets and her troops appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in examples, does not furnish a single parallel. A tranquil and moderate power, which by long and unchanging wisdom had obtained in the circle of monarchies a moral dignity, sees itself assaulted and treated as if it itself had been forging plots, and meditating the ruin of England: and all to justify its prompt and total destruction.

"The Emperor, wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the Courts of the north, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic, which is an enclosed sea, whose tranquillity had been for a long period, and with the privity of the Cabinet of St. James's, the subject of reciprocal guarantee, did not dissemble his resentments against England, and announced to her that he could not remain insensible to it.

"His Majesty did not foresee that when England, having employed her force successfully, was about to bear away her prey, she would commit a new outrage against Denmark, and that his Majesty was to share in it. New proposals were made, each more insidious than the foregoing, which were to connect with the British power, Denmark, subjected, disgraced, and affecting to applaud what had been wrought against her.

"The Emperor still less foresaw that it would be proposed to him that he should guarantee this submission, and that he should pledge himself that this act of violence should have no unpleasant consequences to England. Her Ambassador believed that it was possi-

ble to propose to his Majesty's Ministry, that his Majesty should become the apologist and the protector of what he had so loudly blamed.

"To this proceeding of the Cabinet of St. James's, the Emperor paid no other attention than it deserved. He thought it time to put limits to his moderation.

"The Prince Royal of Denmark, endowed with a character full of energy and nobleness, and possessing from Providence a dignity equal to his high rank, had informed the Emperor, that justly incensed at what had taken place at Copenhagen, he had not ratified the Convention, and considered it as of no effect.

"At this moment he has just communicated to his Imperial Majesty new proposals which have been made to him, which serve only to inflame his resistance instead of appeasing it; because they tend to impress upon his actions the seal of degradation, the impression of which they have never borne.

"The Emperor, touched with the confidence which the Prince Royal placed in him, and having considered his own peculiar complaints against England; having maturely examined, too, the engagements which he had entered into with the powers of the North—engagements formed by the Empress Catharine, and by his late Majesty the Emperor, both of glorious memory, has resolved to fulfil them. His Imperial Majesty, therefore, breaks off all communication with England: he recals the whole of the Mission which he has sent thither; and no longer chuses to keep with him that of his Britannic Majesty. There shall from henceforth be no connection between the two countries.

"The Emperor declares, thus he annuls, for ever, every preceding Convention between England and Russia, and particularly that entered into in 1801, the 5th (17th) of the month of June.

"He proclaims anew the principles of the armed neutrality, that monument of the wisdom of the Empress Catharine, and engages never to recede from that system.

"He demands of England complete satisfaction to all his subjects, for their just reclamations of vessels and

merchandise, detained against the express tenor of treaties concluded in his own reign.

"The Emperor engages, there shall be no re-establishment of concord between Russia and England, till satisfaction shall have been given to Denmark.

"The Emperor expects that his Britannic Majesty, instead of suffering his Ministers, as he does, to lay the seeds of fresh war, listening only to his own feelings, will be disposed to conclude such treaty with his Majesty the Emperor of France, as shall prolong, to use the expression interminably *(a toute la terme)*, the invaluable blessings of peace.

"When the Emperor shall be satisfied upon all the preceding points, and especially upon that of peace between France and England, without which no part of Europe can promise itself real tranquillity, his Imperial Majesty will then gladly resume with Great Britain those relations of amity, which, under the just discontent which he could not but feel, he has perhaps preserved too long."

"Given at St. Petersburgh, 20th (31st) October."

DECLARATION.

THE Declaration issued at *St. Petersburgh*, by His Majesty the Emperor of all the *Russias*, has excited in His Majesty's Mind the strongest Sensations of Astonishment and Regret.

His Majesty was not unaware of the Nature of those Secret Engagements which had been imposed upon *Russia* in the Conferences of *Tilsit*. But His Majesty had entertained the Hope, that a Review of the Transactions of that unfortunate Negotiation, and a just Estimate of it's Effects upon the Glory of the *Russian* Name, and upon the Interests of the *Russian* Empire, would have induced his Imperial Majesty to extricate Himself from the Embarrassment of those new Counsels and Connections which He had adopted in a Mo-

ment of Despondency and Alarm; and to return to a Policy more congenial to the Principles, which He has so invariably professed, and more conducive to the Honour of His Crown, and to the Prosperity of His Dominions.

This Hope has dictated to His Majesty the utmost Forbearance and Moderation in all His diplomatick Intercourse with the Court of *St. Petersburgh* since the Peace of *Tilsit*.

His Majesty had much Cause for Suspicion, and just Ground of Complaint. But He abstained from the Language of Reproach. His Majesty deemed it necessary to require specific Explanation with respect to those Arrangements with *France*, the Concealment of which from His Majesty could not but confirm the Impression already received of their Character and Tendency. But His Majesty, nevertheless, directed the Demand of that Explanation to be made, not only without Asperity or the Indication of any hostile Disposition, but with that considerate Regard to the Feelings and Situation of the Emperor of *Russia*, which resulted from the Recollection of former Friendship, and from Confidence interrupted but not destroyed.

The Declaration of the Emperor of *Russia* proves that the Object of His Majesty's Forbearance and Moderation has not been attained. It proves, unhappily, that the Influence of that Power, which is equally and essentially the Enemy both of *Great Britain* and of *Russia*, has acquired a decided Ascendency in the Counsels of the Cabinet of *St. Petersburgh*; and has been able to excite a causeless Enmity between Two Nations, whose long-established Connection, and whose mutual Interests prescribed the most intimate Union and Co-operation.

His Majesty deeply laments the Extension of the Calamities of War. But called upon as He is, to defend Himself against an Act of unprovoked Hostility, His Majesty is anxious to refute, in the Face of the World, the Pretexts by which that Act is attempted to be justified.

The Declaration asserts that His Majesty the Em-

peror of *Russia* has twice taken up Arms in a Cause, in which the Interest of *Great Britain* was more direct than His own; and founds upon this Assertion the Charge against *Great Britain* of having neglected to second and support the Military Operations of *Russia*.

His Majesty willingly does Justice to the Motives which originally engaged *Russia* in the great Struggle against *France*. His Majesty avows with equal Readiness the Interest which *Great Britain* has uniformly taken in the Fates and Fortunes of the Powers of the Continent. But it would surely be difficult to prove that *Great Britain*, who was Herself in a State of Hostility with *Prussia*, when the War broke out between *Prussia* and *France*, had an Interest and a Duty more direct in espousing the *Prussian* Quarrel, than the Emperor of *Russia*; the Ally of His *Prussian* Majesty, the Protector of the North of *Europe*, and the Guarantee of the *Germanick* Constitution.

It is not in a publick Declaration that His Majesty can discuss the Policy of having, at any particular Period of the War, effected, or omitted to effect, Disembarkations of Troops on the Coasts of *Naples*. But the Instance of the War with the *Porte* is still more singularly chosen to illustrate the Charge against *Great Britain* of Indifference to the Interests of Her Ally: a War undertaken by *Great Britain* at the Instigation of *Russia*, and solely for the Purpose of maintaining *Russian* Interests against the Influence of *France*.

If, however, the Peace of *Tilsit* is, indeed, to be considered as the Consequence and the Punishment of the imputed Inactivity of *Great Britain*, His Majesty cannot but regret that the Emperor of *Russia* should have resorted to so precipitate and fatal a Measure, at the Moment when He had received distinct Assurances that His Majesty was making the most strenuous Exertions to fulfil the Wishes and Expectations of His Ally (Assurances which His Imperial Majesty received and acknowledged with apparent Confidence and Satisfaction); and when His Majesty was, in Fact, prepared to employ for the Advancement of the common Objects of the War, those Forces which, after the Peace of

Tilsit, He was under the Necessity of employing to disconcert a Combination directed against His own immediate Interests and Security.

The Vexation of *Russian* Commerce by *Great Britain* is, in Truth, little more than an imaginary Grievance. Upon a diligent Examination, made by His Majesty's Command, of the Records of the *British* Court of Admiralty there has been discovered only a solitary Instance in the Course of the present War, of the Condemnation of a Vessel really *Russian:* a Vessel which had carried Naval Stores to a Port of the Common Enemy. There are but few Instances of *Russian* Vessels detained: and none in which Justice has been refused to a Party regularly complaining of such Detention. It is therefore Matter of Surprize as well as of Concern to His Majesty that the Emperor of *Russia* should have condescended to bring forward a Complaint which, as it cannot be seriously felt by those in whose Behalf it is urged, might appear to be intended to countenance those exaggerated Declamations, by which *France* perseveringly endeavours to inflame the Jealousy of other Countries, and to justify Her own inveterate Animosity, against *Great Britain.*

The Peace of *Tilsit* was followed by an Offer of Mediation on the Part of the Emperor of *Russia*, for the Conclusion of a Peace between *Great Britain* and *France;* which it is asserted that His Majesty refused.

His Majesty did not refuse the Mediation of the Emperor of *Russia*: although the Offer of it was accompanied by Circumstances of Concealment which might well have justified His Refusal. The Articles of the Treaty of *Tilsit* were not communicated to His Majesty: and specifically that Article of the Treaty, in Virtue of which the Mediation was proposed; and which prescribed a limited Time for the Return of His Majesty's Answer to that Proposal. And His Majesty was thus led into an apparent Compliance with a Limitation so offensive to the Dignity of an Independent Sovereign. But the Answer so returned by His Majesty was not a Refusal. It was a conditional Acceptance. The Conditions required by His Majesty were,—a State-

ment of the Basis upon which the Enemy was disposed to treat; and a Communication of the Articles of the Peace of *Tilsit*. The First of these Conditions was precisely the same which the Emperor of *Russia* had Himself annexed not four Months before to His own Acceptance of the proffered Mediation of the Emperor of *Austria*. The Second was one which His Majesty would have had a Right to require even as the Ally of His Imperial Majesty; but which it would have been highly improvident to omit, when he was invited to confide to His Imperial Majesty the Care of His Honour and of His Interests.

But even if these Conditions (neither of which has been fulfilled, although the Fulfilment of them has been repeatedly required by His Majesty's Ambassador at *St. Petersburgh*) had not been in themselves perfectly natural and necessary; there were not wanting Considerations which might have warranted His Majesty in endeavouring, with more than ordinary Anxiety, to ascertain the Views and Intentions of the Emperor of *Russia*, and the precise Nature and Effect of the new Relations which His Imperial Majesty had contracted.

The complete Abandonment of the Interests of the King of *Prussia*, (who had twice rejected Proposals of separate Peace, from a strict Adherence to His Engagements with His Imperial Ally,) and the Character of those Provisions which the Emperor of *Russia* was contented to make for His own Interests in the Negotiations of *Tilsit*, presented no encouraging Prospect of the Result of any Exertions which His Imperial Majesty might be disposed to employ in Favour of *Great Britain*.

It is not, while a French Army still occupies and lays waste the remaining Dominions of the King of *Prussia*, in spite of the Stipulations of the *Prussian* Treaty of *Tilsit*; while Contributions are arbitrarily exacted by *France* from that Remnant of the *Prussian* Monarchy, such as, in its entire and most flourishing State, the *Prussian* Monarchy would have been unable to discharge; while the Surrender is demanded, in Time of Peace, of *Prussian* Fortresses, which had not been re-

duced during the War; and while the Power of *France* is exercised over *Prussia* with such shameless Tyranny, as to designate and demand for instant Death, Individuals, Subjects of His *Prussian* Majesty, and resident in His Dominions, upon a Charge of Disrespect towards the *French* Government;—it is not while all these Things are done and suffered, under the Eyes of the Emperor of *Russia*, and without his Interference on Behalf of His Ally, that His Majesty can feel Himself called upon to account to *Europe*, for having hesitated to repose an unconditional Confidence in the Efficacy of His Imperial Majesty's Mediation.

Nor, even if that Mediation had taken full Effect, if a Peace had been concluded under it, and that Peace guaranteed by His Imperial Majesty, could His Majesty have placed implicit Reliance on the Stability of any such Arrangement, after having seen the Emperor of *Russia* openly transfer to *France* the Sovereignty of the *Ionian* Republic, the Independence of which His Imperial Majesty had recently and solemnly guaranteed.

But while the alleged Rejection of the Emperor of *Russia*'s Mediation, between *Great Britain* and *France*, is stated as a just Ground of His Imperial Majesty's Resentment; His Majesty's Request of that Mediation, for the Re-establishment of Peace between *Great Britain* and *Denmark*, is represented as an Insult which it was beyond the Bounds of His Imperial Majesty's Moderation to endure.

His Majesty feels Himself under no Obligation to offer any Atonement or Apology to the Emperor of *Russia* for the Expedition against *Copenhagen*. It is not for those who were Parties to the Secret Arrangements at *Tilsit*, to demand Satisfaction for a Measure to which those Arrangements gave rise, and by which one of the Objects of them has been happily defeated.

His Majesty's Justification of the Expedition against *Copenhagen* is before the World. The Declaration of the Emperor of *Russia* would supply whatever was wanting in it; if any Thing could be wanting to convince the most incredulous of the Urgency of that Necessity under which His Majesty acted.

But until the *Russian* Declaration was published, His Majesty had no Reason to suspect that any Opinions which the Emperor of *Russia* might entertain of the Transactions at *Copenhagen* could be such as to preclude His Imperial Majesty from undertaking, at the Request of *Great Britain*, that same Office of Mediator, which He had assumed with so much Alacrity on the Behalf of *France*. Nor can His Majesty forget that the first Symptoms of reviving Confidence, since the Peace of *Tilsit*, the only Prospect of Success in the Endeavours of His Majesty's Ambassador to restore the ancient good Understanding between *Great Britain* and *Russia*, appeared when the Intelligence of the Siege of *Copenhagen* had been recently received at *St. Petersburgh*.

The Inviolability of the *Baltic* Sea, and the Reciprocal Guarantees of the Powers that Border upon it, Guarantees said to have been contracted with the Knowledge of the *British* Government, are stated as Aggravations of His Majesty's Proceedings in the *Baltic*. It cannot be intended to represent His Majesty as having at any Time acquiesced in the Principles upon which the Inviolability of the *Baltic* is maintained; however His Majesty may at particular Periods have forborne, for special Reasons influencing His Conduct at the Time, to act in Contradiction to them. Such Forbearance never could have applied but to a State of Peace and real Neutrality in the North; and His Majesty most assuredly could not be expected to recur to it, after *France* has been suffered to establish Herself in undisputed Sovereignty along the whole Coast of the *Baltic* Sea from *Dantzig* to *Lubeck*.

But the higher the Value which the Emperor of *Russia* places on the Engagements respecting the Tranquillity of the *Baltic*, which He describes Himself as inheriting from His immediate Predecessors, the Empress *Catherine* and the Emperor *Paul*, the less justly can His Imperial Majesty resent the Appeal made to Him by His Majesty as the Guarantee of the Peace to be concluded between *Great Britain* and *Denmark*. In making that Appeal, with the utmost Confidence and Sincerity, His Majesty neither intended, nor can He ima-

gine that He offered any Insult to the Emperor of *Russia*. Nor can His Majesty conceive that, in proposing to the Prince Royal Terms of Peace, such as the most successful War on the Part of *Denmark* could hardly have been expected to extort from *Great Britain*, His Majesty rendered Himself liable to the Imputation, either of exasperating the Resentment, or of outraging the Dignity, of *Denmark*.

His Majesty has thus replied to all the different Accusations by which the *Russian* Government labours to justify the Rupture of a Connection which has subsisted for Ages, with reciprocal Advantage to *Great Britain* and *Russia*; and attempts to disguise the Operation of that external Influence by which *Russia* is driven into unjust Hostilities for Interests not her own.

The *Russian* Declaration proceeds to announce the several Conditions on which alone these Hostilities can be terminated, and the Intercourse of the Two Countries renewed.

His Majesty has already had Occasion to assert that Justice has in no Instance been denied to the Claims of His Imperial Majesty's Subjects.

The Termination of the War with *Denmark* has been so anxiously sought by His Majesty, that it cannot be necessary for His Majesty to renew any Professions upon that Subject. But His Majesty is at a Loss to reconcile the Emperor of *Russia's* present Anxiety for the Completion of such an Arrangement, with His Imperial Majesty's recent Refusal to contribute His good Offices for effecting it.

The Requisition of His Imperial Majesty for the immediate Conclusion, by His Majesty, of a Peace with *France*, is as extraordinary in the Substance, as it is offensive in the Manner. His Majesty has at no Time declined to treat with *France*, when *France* has professed a Willingness to treat on an admissible Basis. *And the Emperor of Russia cannot fail to remember that the last Negotiation between Great Britain and France was broken off, upon Points immediately affecting, not His Majesty's own Interests, but those of His Imperial Ally.* But His Majesty neither understands nor will

He admit the Pretension of the Emperor of *Russia* to dictate the Time, or the Mode, of His Majesty's pacific Negotiations with other Powers. It never will be endured by His Majesty that any Government shall indemnify itself for the Humiliation of Subserviency to *France*, by the Adoption of an insulting and peremptory Tone towards *Great Britain*.

His Majesty proclaims anew those Principles of Maritime Law, against which the Armed Neutrality, under the Auspices of the Empress *Catherine*, was originally directed; and against which the present Hostilities of *Russia* are denounced. Those Principles have been recognised and acted upon in the best Periods of the History of *Europe*: and acted upon by no Power with more Strictness and Severity than by *Russia* Herself in the Reign of the Empress *Catherine*.

Those Principles it is the Right and the Duty of His Majesty to maintain: And against every Confederacy His Majesty is determined, under the Blessing of Divine Providence, to maintain them. They have at all Times contributed essentially to the Support of the Maritime Power of *Great Britain;* but they are become incalculably more valuable and important at a Period when the Maritime Power of *Great Britain* constitutes the sole remaining Bulwark against the overwhelming Usurpations of *France;* the only Refuge to which other Nations may yet resort, in happier Times, for Assistance and Protection.

When the Opportunity for Peace between *Great Britain* and *Russia* shall arrive, His Majesty will embrace it with Eagerness. The Arrangements of such a Negotiation will not be difficult or complicated. His Majesty, as He has nothing to concede, so He has nothing to require: Satisfied, if *Russia* shall manifest a Disposition to return to Her ancient Feelings of Friendship towards *Great Britain;* to a just Consideration of Her own true Interests; and to a Sense of Her own Dignity as an Independent Nation.

Westminster, December 18, 1807.

III.—CORRESPONDENCE WITH AUSTRIA.

Note from Prince de Starhemberg, to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated Nov. 20, 1807.

(Translation.)

London, Nov. 20th, 1807.

The Undersigned has the honour to inform his Excellency, Mr. Canning, Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, that he has received positive orders from his Court, to make to the British Ministry the most earnest representations on the importance of putting an end to the struggle which still exists between England and France; and the effects of which may produce to the rest of Europe the most fatal consequences. His Majesty the Emperor and King, animated by a constant desire to effect the restoration of repose and tranquillity, does not hesitate to request officially and earnestly His Britannic Majesty to declare his intentions on this point, in evincing to him his disposition to enter into a negociation for a maritime peace, upon a basis suitable to the reciprocal interests of the Powers who may take a part in it.

The Cabinet of St. James's has explained itself too often respecting its desire for the re-establishment of peace, for the Undersigned not to flatter himself that he shall now obtain the formal assurance wished for by his Court, which will completely prove to all the nations of Europe, the sincerity of the pacific views of England.

The Undersigned avails himself of this occasion to request his Excellency, the Secretary of State, to accept the offer of his high consideration.

(Signed) LOUIS PRINCE DE STARHEMBERG.

Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to the Prince de Starhemberg, dated November 23, 1807.

The Undersigned, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has laid before the King His Master the official Note presented by the Prince de Starhemberg, Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Ple-

Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to the Prince de Starhemberg, dated January 8, 1808.

The Undersigned, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has laid before the King his Master, the Note delivered to him on the second of this month by the Prince de Starhemberg, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria.

In stating himself to be charged to propose to the British Government the immediate sending of Plenipotentiaries to Paris, the Prince de Starhemberg has omitted to explain from whom he has received that Commission, whether from His Imperial Master, or from the Government of France.

If the Prince de Starhemberg has in this instance acted under the specific and immediate orders of his Court, and if the proposal to His Majesty to send Plenipotentiaries to Paris is to be considered as originating at Vienna, the Undersigned is commanded to express His Majesty's concern that so little reference should appear to have been had, in framing the proposal now offered for His Majesty's consideration, to the correspondence which has already taken place between the Courts of London and Vienna, upon the subject of a negociation for peace.

After so long an interval has been suffered to elapse since the acceptance by His Majesty, in April last, of the offer of His Imperial Majesty's mediation, His Majesty could hardly have expected that the same offer should now be repeated (if indeed the Prince de Starhemberg's Note is to be construed as a repetition of it), without any notification of the acceptance of those conditions which were at that time stated by His Majesty to be indispensable preliminaries to the opening of a negotiation. And while the Note of the Undersigned of the 23d of November last, is cited by the Prince de Starhemberg as the foundation of the present proposal, His Majesty observes with surprise, that this proposal nevertheless extends only to the powers combined with

France in the war against Great Britain, and not to the Allies of Great Britain in the war with France.

If, on the other hand, the Court of Vienna is no otherwise concerned in the step which the Prince de Starhemberg has taken, than as having generally authorized that Minister to receive and to convey to the British Government whatever communications the Government of France might think fit to entrust to him, the Undersigned is commanded, in that case, to remark to the Prince de Starhemberg, that although the character which the Prince de Starhemberg holds from the Court of Vienna, and the formalities by which he is accredited to His Majesty, entitle him to immediate and implicit confidence in every exercise of his diplomatic functions, in the name and on the behalf of His Imperial Master; yet that when he professes to speak in the name of another Power, the statement of some precise authority, and the production of some specific and authenticated document, could alone justify the Court to which he addresses himself, in founding a public and important measure upon such a communication.

From the tenor of the Prince de Starhemberg's Note it appears, that the Note of the Undersigned of the 23d of November, has been communicated to the Government of France.

The Government of France is therefore in possession of a solemn and authentic pledge of the pacific dispositions of His Majesty. It follows that a pledge equally solemn and authentic, of the reciprocal dispositions of France, is reasonably to be expected by His Majesty, before His Majesty can be called upon to make any further advance.

The proposal to His Majesty to send Negociators to Paris, unaccompanied as it is with any ostensible and unequivocal return on the part of France for the declarations already made in His Majesty's name, is so far from being a proof of any such reciprocal disposition, that it can be construed no otherwise by His Majesty, than as implying an unjustifiable doubt of the sincerity of His Majesty's professions.

Nor is the want of such formal authority and of such reciprocal assurance, the only, or the most material defect in the Prince de Starhemberg's communication.

His Majesty is called upon to send Plenipotentiaries to Paris to negotiate for peace, without the slightest intimation being given to His Majesty of the basis on which it is proposed that such negotiation should be founded.

If it could ever have been matter of doubt whether the previous settlement of a basis of negotiation were necessary to the hope of its successful termination, the experience of the last negociation with France would have placed that question beyond controversy.

The experience of the last negociation has farther demonstrated the disadvantage and inconveniency of a negociation conducted at Paris.

His Majesty is willing to treat with France; but he will treat only on a footing of perfect equality. He is ready to treat with the Allies of France; but the negociation must equally embrace the interests of the Allies of Great Britain.

As soon as the basis of negociation shall have been satisfactorily ascertained, and an unexceptionable place of negociation agreed upon, His Majesty will be prepared to name Plenipotentiaries to meet those of the other Powers engaged in the war: but His Majesty will not again consent to send his Plenipotentiaries to a hostile capital.

But while His Majesty has permitted the Undersigned to address this frank and unequivocal exposition of His Majesty's sentiments to the Minister of the Emperor of Austria, the Undersigned is at the same time charged to state distinctly to the Prince de Starhemberg, that, not having received any authentic proof of the Prince de Starhemberg's commission to enter into any explanations in the name of the French Government, or to afford any assurances by which that Government could be bound, His Majesty has not directed the Undersigned to give any authority to the Prince de Starhemberg to speak in the name of His Majesty to the Government of France.

The Undersigned has the honour to request the Prince de Starhemberg to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

Foreign Office, January 8th, 1808.

Note from the Prince de Starhemberg to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated London, January 12, 1808. *Received the* 13*th.*

(Translation.)

London, 12*th January,* 1808.

The Undersigned has the honour to inform his Excellency the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, that in consequence of orders from his Court, the present circumstances oblige him to demand passports for himself and all the individuals of the Austrian Mission at London. The Undersigned purposes to make use of them as soon as he shall have received from the French Government the passports which he demanded by the Messenger whom he dispatched yesterday.

The Undersigned requests his Excellency to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) LOUIS PRINCE DE STARHEMBERG.

Letter from Mr. Secretary Canning to the Prince de Starhemberg, dated January 13, 1808.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1808.

SIR,

Having received information that Mr. Adair has actually quitted Vienna, in consequence of an intimation from the Austrian Government; I have the honour of requesting that you will have the goodness to acquaint me what is the latest date, at which you have reason to believe that Mr. Adair was still at Vienna. I have, &c.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

Note from the Prince de Starhemberg to Mr. Secretary Canning, dated London, January 13, 1808.

(Translation.)

London, 13th January, 1808.

In answer to the Note which the Undersigned has just received from his Excellency the Secretary of State, he has the honour to inform his Excellency, that the last dispatches which he has received from his Court, were of the 30th of October, and that no mention was made in them of the departure of Mr. Adair.

The Undersigned requests his Excellency to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) LOUIS PRINCE DE STARHEMBERG.

Note from Mr. Secretary Canning to the Prince de Starhemberg, dated January 13th, 1808.

Foreign Office, January 13th, 1808.

The Undersigned, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to inclose to the Prince de Starhemberg, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the passports which he has demanded for himself and for the Austrian Mission at this Court; having it at the same time in command from the King his Master, to express His Majesty's deep regret, that the circumstances of the time, and the orders of his Court, should have imposed on the Prince de Starhemberg the necessity of demanding them.

The Undersigned requests the Prince de Starhemberg to accept the assurances of his highest consideration.

(Signed) GEORGE CANNING.

ERRATA—Preface, p. xvi. l. 5, for *impartially*, read *impartiality*.
Ditto, ditto, l. 6, for *ceme*, read *come*.

J. M'CREERY, Printer,
Black-horse court, Fleet-street.